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ABSTRACT 
An evaluation was conducted in three regions of Ghana to determine if the 
strategy described within the Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response in Ghana (2002) is achieving its intended objectives within the health 
facility and community and to provide recommendations to stakeholders. A 
comprehensive review of documents and interviews of key informants at each level of the 
strategy from the national surveillance team to the community-based surveillance (CBS) 
volunteer were conducted. The strategy can only be described as useful at the level of the 
health facility. Within all but one sub-district evaluated, the community level of the 
strategy cannot be described as useful due to its declining state. 
System attributes of the facility (CDC surveillance evaluation indicators) were 
found to be sufficient. With few exceptions, the core functions were generally operating 
at a minimal level, however. Although technical determinants (i.e. guidelines, training 
materials and reporting forms) were found to be of high quality and appropriate, many 
v 
essential materials were lacking within the facilities sampled. Organization and 
worliforce and workforce pe1jormance determinants were found to be lacking in a 
number of key areas. 
A number of concrete recommendations resulted from this evaluation. The CBS 
volunteer component should be eliminated from the national strategy. Key community 
members, especially those involved in health-related activities, should be sensitized to 
identify and report. Clinicians should be provided with training within facilities with a 
focus on managing and sustaining the seven core functions. Districts and facilities should 
routinely monitor the availability of the IDSR guidelines, standard case definitions, and 
all essential documents. A national initiative holding all health facilities accountable for 
weekly and monthly reporting is wan·anted , as well as an increased expectation of health 
facility level management of the seven core functions. Several ingredients are needed to 
achieve an exemplary IDSR strategy, including: review of the technical materials created 
for Ghana during the implementation of IDSR in the three northern regions; strategic 
allocation of resources; an increased focus on the role ofthe clinician; consideration of 
demographic change, especially on the periphery of large cities; and strong political will. 
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CHAPTER 1: Purpose 
Relevance to Improving the Health of the Public 
Demographic and health profile 
Located along the Gulf of Guinea in West Africa, Ghana is situated between Cote 
d'Jvoire to the west, Burkina Faso to the north and Togo to the east (Figure 1). Included 
amongst the larger populations of 
Figure 1. Map: Ghana and neighboring countries 
Africa, Ghana' s estimated population 
Burkina Faso 
of24.8 million [I, 2] is expected 
to reach 35 million by 2025 [3]. Its 
economy, also one ofthe largest in 
Africa, estimated to be 38.24 billion 
COte d lvoi'e ( 
USD (PPP), is growing at an annual ________ _____)---./ 
Gulf of Guinea 
rate of 6.2% [4]. 
Over the twenty-year period from 1988 to 2008, Ghana's fertility rate steadily 
decreased from 6.4 to 4 children per woman. Large differences can be found across 
regions, however. In 2008, the women of the Greater Accra Region, for example, had an 
average of2.5 children compared to 6.8 for those living in the Northern Region [5] . A 
similar decline can been found in the infant mortality rate (IMR). Measured at 77 per 
1000 live births in 1988 [5] , Ghana's IMR of 47 per 1000 is at present lower than that of 
neighboring Burkina Faso and Togo (91 and 64 per 1000 respectively) [6]. Life 
expectancy, having increased over the fifty year period from 1954 through 2005 (40 years 
vs. 60 years respectively) [6, 7], shows a small advantage over neighboring countries as 
well: Burkina Faso (52) and Togo (59) [6]. Indicative of the stability ofthe public health 
infrastructure and country as a whole, immunization coverage follows a similar pattern of 
comparison. Hib3 immunization among one-year olds, for example, has been reported as 
94%, 81% and 89% in Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Togo respectively [6]. Political 
stability, economic growth, and an improved health infrastructure may be amongst the 
factors contributing to this modestly lower mortality compared to other countries in the 
region. 
A UN AIDS trend analysis of several years ' data indicates that the HIV prevalence 
rate has been decreasing in nine out often of Ghana' s regions. The country' s 2.9% 
prevalence in 2009 is lower than that of many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa [8]. 
Despite the epidemiologic transition currently underway, communicable diseases 
continue to make the largest contribution to Ghana 's mortality (66%) [6]. Almost two 
million cases of malaria were reported by the health system in 2009 [ 6]. In addition to 
malaria, HIV/AIDS, lower respiratory infections, dian·heal diseases and tuberculosis rank 
amongst the most frequently reported causes of death [9]. Despite progress in recent 
decades toward the eradication of Guinea worm and control of other infectious diseases, 
Ghana continues to experience large infectious disease outbreaks, with meningitis and 
cholera being amongst the most noteworthy [ 1 0-12]. 
The country' s epidemiologic transition is characterized by an increase in both a 
burden of chronic disease and emerging health threats, such as injuries from automobile 
accidents. Non-communicable disease presently makes up 25% of life-years lost 
nationally [6]. Of these, circulatory disease was ranked by Agyei-Mensah, S. (2007) as 
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the country ' s number one cause of mortality in 2001 of all diseases and health events 
including infectious disease [13, 14]. An analysis of data from the Morbidity and 
Burden of Disease Estimates for WHO Member States (2002) supports this assertion. It 
reveals that all types of cardiovascular disease combined accounted for more deaths than 
any single infectious disease or other non-communicable condition [9]. Diabetes, for 
example, is a major contributor to morbidity in Accra and other Ghanaian cities with 
similar demographics [15, 16]. 
Three regions characteristic of Ghana's diversity and transition 
The Public Health Department divides the country into three broad epidemiologic 
zones possessing unique demographic and geographic characteristics relevant to public 
health programming. The diverse epidemiologic characteristics of these three zones, 
reflecting Ghana's growing population and demographic transition, create broad 
implications for the management of the IDSR strategy. For the purposes of this 
evaluation, the three zones will be referred to as the "Nmih", "Middle Belt" and 
"Coastal". 
The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Partners for 
Health Reformplus (PHRPlus) supported the implementation of the strategy in three 
regions in the North from 2000 to 2005. The North is comprised ofthe three northern 
most regions: Upper East, Upper West, and Northern. Compared to the other zones it has 
a higher level of poverty and less access to services due to a lack of paved roads. 
Especially prone to infectious disease epidemics, it recently harbored the last of the 
country' s Guinea worm cases and experiences yearly transmission of meningococcal 
3 
meningitis in each of its three regions [ 10, 11]. The majority of the population, 
dependent upon farming for its livelihood, lives in smaller widely dispersed communities 
that have been referred to as both "settlements" and "villages" reportedly having a 
median of200 people each [18]. The exposure ofthe North to the neighboring countries 
of Cote d ' lvoire, Burkina Faso, and Togo may have implications for international disease 
transmission due to regular movement across borders. 
Situated on the opposite end of the length of the country along the Gulf of Guinea 
coastline [19], the Coastal zone stands out as the largest most developed economic region 
of the country. Having the highest population density, the Coastal zone is home to 
Ghana' s highest percentage of urban dwellers. The Ghana Health Service (GHS) 
estimates that 85% of the Greater Accra Region' s more than 3 million residents are 
urbanites. The Accra district, a major metropolis of over two million people, has 
numerous government hospitals and clinics and many private health care facilities. 
Along with economic prosperity, Accra leads the country' s epidemiologic transition 
characterized by an increased burden of chronic disease including cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes, hypertension, and other diseases [ 15 , 16]. Infectious diseases, however, 
continue to make a major contribution to morbidity and mortality. Recent outbreaks of 
cholera [12] and a malaria prevalence of 12% [20] serve as examples of the threat of 
infectious diseases in the country' s capital. A high incidence of infectious disease 
coupled with an increase of non-communicable disease as a result of the epidemiologic 
transition has created a unique public health situation in Accra. Agyei-Mensah et al. 
(20 1 0) describe a "protracted" double burden of chronic and infectious diseases in Accra 
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responsible for the majority of the city's morbidity and mortality. Whereas the wealthy 
are now experiencing a high burden of chronic disease as a result ofthe epidemiologic 
transition, the urban poor experience a double burden characterized by a higher risk of 
infectious disease coupled with chronic diseases [ 14]. 
The Middle Belt, including the Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti, Eastern and Volta regions, 
has been called a "transition" zone characterized as geographically, developmentally, and 
economically falling between the North and Coastal zones. Boasting provincial 
populations in the millions, including the country's largest (Ashanti Region, 4.7 million 
[2]), the Middle Belt is distinguished by a predominantly rural population and a lower 
population density compared to the Coastal zone. 
Justification for an evaluation of IDSR at the sub-district level 
This evaluation aimed to measure the performance of the IDSR strategy at the 
conclusion of the decade during which the Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response in Ghana (2002) [21] was utilized as the guiding document 
for implementation and management of the strategy. The findings are intended to 
accompany the updated strategy found within the second edition which was created in 
2011 in response to the release ofthe Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response in the African Region, 2nd ed. (201 0)[22] by the WHO. The 
most significant changes that have been made to Ghana's guidelines are the addition of 
public health "events", such as injuries, an increase in the number of priority diseases 
under surveillance, and the incorporation for the first time of the International Health 
Regulations (2005) (IHR) [23]. The GHS has plans to introduce the updated Technical 
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Guidelines at district health management teams (DHMT) training workshops. 
A Jack of understanding of the gaps that exist at the point of data collection or 
where the "frontline" workers are involved in the strategy has been cited by health 
officials in Ghana as a shmtcoming of IDSR implementation in a country where the 
strategy is otherwise strong. Data quality issues and gaps at the sub-district level 
associated with, but not limited to, consistency, timeliness, communication, and 
supervision were described by authorities from the GHS during pre-study meetings in 
April 2011. Integral to the functioning ofiDSR, the community and health facility levels 
have not frequently been the focus of IDSR evaluations performed in Ghana or beyond. 
Furthermore, few evaluations of community-based surveillance (CBS) have been made 
available within the public domain. This evaluation, possibly the first of its kind to 
systematically evaluate the seven core functions ofiDSR within the community and 
health facility taking into consideration performance determinants, can provide valuable 
information to all of the forty-four countries in Africa that have an IDSR strategy. 
IHR (2005) [23] and the WHO Technical Guidelines (2010) [22] make clear the 
need to strengthen international public health surveillance in response to the rapid 
changes being brought on by globalization. These guidelines specifically state the 
importance of surveillance and response at the community level and its role within global 
public health surveillance. One objective of the WHO Technical Guidelines states, for 
example, "Emphasize community participation in detection and response to public health 
problems including event based surveillance and response in line with IHR (2005)." [22] 
The demographic and health data of Ghana point to a complicated relationship between 
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non-communicable and infectious diseases that may be indicative of what will be seen at 
the local level across Africa as globalization takes hold. Large Ghanaian cities, along 
with numerous others across the African continent, may soon, if not already, begin to 
experience Accra' s double burden of disease. The needs and problems associated with 
IDSR implementation within a sub-metro located in a growing metropolis undergoing 
transition may be different from those of less populated sub-districts, which only have a 
rural health center or health post that is difficult for the population and authorities alike to 
reach. Having been an early implementer, Ghana is amongst a small group of countries 
that have shared lessons related to implementation with other Member States. As Ghana 
is likely to be one of the first countries to update its guidelines, the findings of this 
evaluation may be helpful to other countries as they take on this challenging task. 
The evaluation focused on the strategy during the period oftime in which the first 
edition of the Technical Guidelines was being utilized, any reference to the guidelines 
from this point forward refers to the first edition (2002) unless specified otherwise. 
Background and Significance 
The IDSR strategy of the WHO Regional Office for Africa 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response or "IDSR" was adopted in 1998 by 
Member States of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa at the 48th session held in 
Zimbabwe as the regional strategy for early detection in order to allow for timely and 
efficacious responses to priority communicable diseases [33]. The IDSR strategy "aims to 
strengthen countries' capacity to collect, analyze, interpret, and disseminate information 
7 
to decision makers through the establishment of multi-disease surveillance systems that 
build upon existing surveillance structures, resources, and personnel with a focus on the 
district level" [34]. The forty-four countries within the AFRO region receive guidance 
and recommendations for the implementation of IDSR from the WHO and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The specific objectives ofiDSR for the 
region (Appendix 1) provide an overview for understanding the core functions of the 
strategy as described within the Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response in the African Region, 211d ed. (2010) [22] , the principal document created 
to assist countries to develop their respective IDSR strategies. 
The WHO Regional Office for Africa has compiled a list of priority diseases, 
conditions and events (Appendix 2) that Member States can use as a guide during the 
development or updating of national guidelines. Each country's IDSR strategy differs 
according to its local context, political situation, and level of financial support and 
technical assistance received from donor organizations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO). Ultimately, countries create a unique list of priority diseases, 
conditions and events based on national priorities and local epidemiologic profile. The 
priority disease and response matrix provides a means for planning activities for each 
level ofthe strategy. The focus of this evaluation, the community and health facility , 
rests at the first and second levels of the matrix, respectively (Table 1 below). 
International Health Regulations (2005) 
IHR (2005) were developed "to prevent, protect against, control and provide a 
public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are 
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commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade [23]." Following the decision of the 
AFRO region that Member States incorporate the IHR (2005) within their existing IDSR 
strategies, the regulations have made a major contribution to the changes found within the 
second edition of the technical guidelines for the African region [22, 23]. According to 
the guidelines, the IDSR strategy can provide the following to further the implementation 
of IHR (2005) within the African region [22]: 
- Infrastructure and resources for surveillance, investigation, confirmation, reporting 
and response. 
-Experienced human resources. 
-Defined implementation process (sensitization, assessment, plan of action, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation). 
- Generic guides for assessment; plan of action development; technical guidelines; 
training materials; tools and Standard Operating Procedures that incorporate IHR 
components. 
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Table 1 Detect and respond to priority disease matrix1 
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 Evaluate 
Identify Report Analyze Investigate Respond Provide and Improve 
and Feedback the System 
Interpret 
Community 
Health facility 
District, State, 
Province 
National 
National WHO 
Representative, 
WHO Regional 
Office 
1Adapted from Detect and respond to priority disease matrix, WHO Regional Office for Africa 
and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), EPO- Division of International Health, 
NCID- Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Atlanta, GA. Available 
from: http://www.cdc.gov/idsr/files/disease matrix.pd 
The IDSR Strategy of Ghana 
Background 
Ghana was one of the earliest countries in the AFRO region to assess its capacity 
and plan for IDSR implementation [17]. Prior to the development of its IDSR guidelines, 
Ghana reviewed the strengths, weaknesses and oppottunities of its existing surveillance 
system and developed the Plan of Action for IDSR [21]. Early progress in 
implementation and the continued success of IDSR in Ghana may be partially explained 
by the attention given to the implementation of the strategy by international 
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organizations, especially those supported by the U.S. Government. Of the 46 African 
countries in which the U.S. Government has supported the design and implementation of 
IDSR through AFRO, Ghana is one of eight that have received additional technical 
assistance from the CDC and USAID [35]. Furthermore, Ghana was one of four 
countries included in a three year interagency agreement (IAA) between USAID and 
CDC developed in 2002 to strengthen IDSR implementation in Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zimbabwe [36]. USAID funded NGOs to provide technical support for the design 
and implementation of IDSR including Quality Health Partners (QHP), EngenderHealth, 
and Abt Associates. The QHP project serves as an example of how U.S. funded technical 
assistance supported implementation. After conducting a baseline analysis of 
surveillance including the availability of resources and completeness of reporting forms 
in seven southern regions and select health facilities [37] , the QHP provided support for 
the implementation ofiDSR in 200 health facilities in 30 districts in 2004 [38]. 
The implementation process in Ghana is well documented, possibly considerably 
more so than most other countries in the region . The implementation ofUSAID's five-
year (2000-2005) PHRPlus IDSR project in Ghana and Tanzania, for example, is 
described in a comprehensive report produced by Abt Associates (2006) [17]. An 
evaluation of the IDSR strategy by Nsubuga et al. (2010) [39] in Ghana and the other 
three IAA countries mentioned above was published by the journal Global Public Health. 
Both the community and health facility levels as defined within the Technical Guidelines 
are implicated along with the sub-district health team (SDHT) wherever the "sub-district" 
is referred to within this document,. 
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"Gaps" of the IDSR strategy at the sub-district level in Ghana 
According to the Technical Guidelines health facilit ies provide supervision of 
community level surveillance that involves the participation of CBS volunteers, 
community leaders and key community members. Appendix 3 provides the case 
definitions ofthe priority diseases ofthe community level. A description of the skills and 
activities associated with each core function of IDSR for the community and health 
facility levels can be found in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. 
Table 2. Detect and respond activities and skills matrix - community level1 
1.0 Identify 2.0 Report 3.0 Analyze and Interpret 
Community Use simple case Know which health Involve local leaders in observing 
definitions to events to report to the and interpreting disease patterns and 
identify local health facility and trends in the community 
priority diseases when to report them 
or conditions in 
the community 
4.0 Investigate 5.0 Respond 6.0 Provide 7.0 Evaluate and 
Feedback Improve the System 
Support case Assist health authorities in Give feedback to Decide if public health 
investigation activities selecting response activities community action took place as 
such as informing the members planned 
community ofthe Participate in response about reported cases 
problem case finding activities and prevention Evaluate the community 
and collecting specimens activities response to the public 
Mobilise community health action 
resources appropriate for 
response activity 
Carry out community health 
education 
I 0 0 Adapted from the survetllance actiVIties to detect and respond the pnonty diseases at level of the 
health facility table, Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in 
Ghana, 2002 
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Table 3. Detect and respond activities and skills matrix- health facility level1 
1.0 Identify 2.0 Report 3.0 Analyze and Interpret 
Health • Use standard case definitions • Repo11 case-based • Prepare and periodically update 
facility to identify priority diseases or information for graphs, tables and charts to describe 
conditions that present in: immediately notifiable time, person and place for reported 
• Inpatient and outpatient diseases diseases and conditions 
services • Report data gathered • Identify and inform district level 
• Community reports from inpatient immediately of any disease or 
• Record information about • and outpatient services condition that: 
suspected cases in and from community and o Exceeds an epidemic threshold 
clinic register and patient private sector sources 0 Occurs in locations where it was 
case notes • Report summary data to previously absent 
• Use local laboratory district level o Occurs more often in a population 
capacity to diagnose suspected • Report laboratory results group than previously 
cases from screening sentient o Presents unusual trends or 
• Use standard protocols to populations at target patterns 
process laboratory specimens sites (for example, STI • Interpret results. Discuss possible 
• Collect and transport clinic, MCH public health action with district 
clinical specimens for service, blood bank) • Observe changes in trends during 
laboratory investigation routine analysis of laboratory results 
4.0 Investigate 5.0 Respond 6.0 Provide 7.0 Evaluate and Improve the System 
Feedback 
• Take part in • Treat cases and • Give • Monitor timeliness and completeness for 
investigation of contacts according feedback to reporting routine and case-based 
reported outbreaks to standard case community information to the district level 
• Collect, package, or management members • Evaluate routine detection and reporting 
store and transport guidelines about outcome of priority diseases and conditions 
specimens for • Use appropriate of reported • Evaluate preparedness for and timeliness 
laboratory infection control cases and of response activities 
testing measures prevention • Evaluate appropriateness of case 
• Use investigation • Carry out public activities management 
and laboratory results health response • Take action to improve reporting practices 
to confirm the outbreak with the district • Take action to improve readiness for 
• Process and record level timely response to outbreaks 
laboratory results • Mobilise • Maintain contact with community to 
• Provide the results community maintain preparedness and prevention 
to district health involvement in activities 
management the response • Monitor the interval between receipt of 
committee, • Advocate for specimens and sending of results 
clinical staff and patient resources • Monitor quality of laboratory results 
.. Adapted from the smveJilance actlvitles to detect and respond the pnonty diseases at level ofthe 
health facility table, Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in 
Ghana, 2002 
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SDHTs have responsibility for detecting and responding to twenty-three priority diseases 
(Appendix 4). Health facilities and sub-districts have one of two surveillance and 
response strategy realities. A number of sub-districts have a sub-district disease control 
officer, usually posted in a health center, who has responsibility for leading activities 
related to the seven core functions . All facilities, nonetheless, have clinicians with 
surveillance and response responsibilities regardless of the presence of a disease control 
officer in the sub-district. 
IDSR strategy stakeholders from the WHO Country Office in Ghana, the Public 
Health Division of the GHS , the GA West district, and Pokuase sub-district revealed in 
preliminary interviews that while the strategy is generally strong at the national, regional, 
and district levels, data quality issues and gaps associated with, but not limited to, 
consistency, timeliness, communication, and supervision exist at the sub-district level. 
The following includes information related to the "gaps" provided by interviewees. 
• Lack of community-based surveillance volunteers. Many, however, are available 
for national immunization days. 
• Volunteers not reporting regularly. 
• Volunteers not motivated to conduct surveillance responsibilities. 
• Lack of monitoring and supervision of volunteers. 
• Lack oftranspm1ation for volunteers and supervision activities. 
• No incentives available to motivate volunteers. 
• Lack of documents for volunteers, i.e. reporting register. 
• Reorganization within the health system creating some organizational ambiguity 
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not yet resolved in one district. Some facilities are reporting select data directly to the 
district bypassing the newly appointed sub-district focal person. Three sub-district 
surveillance officers were working from a district office. 
• Lack of software. 
• Lack of hardware. 
o Computers 
o Phones 
o Internet connection 
o Handheld devices 
• Lack of transport at regional and district levels. 
• Data quality/consistency issues from level to level. For example, each level has 
different data from the same period because data that are missing from lower levels 
are added after the deadline by the district but not updated at the regional level due to 
software limitations. 
• Lack of transport, fuel , and per diem for supervisory visits. Fuel, money and 
training and refresher training are needed for district officers. M&E is not being 
performed once a month as recommended. 
• Inconsistencies known to exist at the level of the "front-line" where data is 
collected not understood by higher levels. 
• Poor data quality and management including data inconsistencies. 
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Questions and specific aims 
1. Is Ghana's Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy achieving 
its intended objectives at the health facility (HF) and community levels? 
2. How can the IDSR strategy of the sub-district be improved to better meet the needs 
of stakeholders? 
o To describe the IDSR strategy at the health facility and community levels and 
indicate its usefulness. 
o To measure the performance of Ghana's IDSR strategy at the sub-district level by 
assessing simplicity, flexibility, data quality, acceptability, timeliness, and stability, 
the seven core functions, and three determinants of performance. 
o To make recommendations based on the findings of the evaluation with a focus on 
how the updated technical guidelines for Ghana can be best applied considering data 
quality issues and gaps that exist within the sub-district. 
o To make available lessons learned that can be utilized by all ofthe World Health 
Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) Member States as they 
embark on the process of updating and rolling-out national guidelines based on the 
Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in the African 
Region, 2nd ed. (2010). 
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CHAPTER 2: Literature review 
The WHO recommends the periodic evaluation of countries ' communicable 
disease surveillance systems as a means of creating accountability and assuring that 
systems meet the objectives for which they were developed [ 43]. The technical 
guidelines for the African region provide a means for the periodic evaluation of the 
district level using the IDSR core indicators. The guidelines describe evaluation as a 
methodology which can be used " ... to assess the effectiveness of the surveillance and 
response system in terms of timeliness, quality of data, preparedness, case management, 
overall performance and using the indicators to identify gaps or areas that could be 
strengthened [22]." 
Evaluations found within the scientific literature and technical reports are more 
likely to be national or multi-country studies focusing on the performance of the IDSR 
strategy at or above the district level (i.e. district, state, province, national) [ 17, 39] . A 
number of these studies have evaluated aspects of IDSR outside the realm of the 
traditional epidemiologic surveillance evaluation. A cost of implementation study 
conducted by Somda et al. (2009) serves as an example [45]. The following review 
includes only studies that can strictly be described as surveillance performance 
evaluations. 
A monitoring and evaluation study, conducted in 2003 by Rumisha eta!. (2007) 
five years after the beginning of implementation of IDSR in Tanzania, concluded that 
IDSR had not been effectively rolled-out in most of the country. The twelve districts 
sampled were not monitoring the performance of their surveillance systems, analysis was 
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not being performed at the facility and district levels, and timeliness of reporting was 
inadequate . The authors noted that much of the implementation strategy had not been 
carried out as planned, especially at the lower levels. The study concluded that barriers 
to full implementation had included overburdened health facility staff, poor 
communication, poor laboratory capacity, poor incentives, poor organizational capacity, 
and insufficient financial resources. The study recommended that the capacities of health 
workers at all levels be strengthened [ 46). 
The WHO and partners conducted a documentation exercise in December of2002 
in six African countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali , Uganda and Sudan) with 
the aim of collecting information related to lessons learned, successes, challenges and 
opportunities of IDSR implementation in order to inform the scale-up of IDSR 
implementation in Africa and other regions (WHO, 2003) [ 47]. The report concludes that 
although achievement had been made towards implementation at the national level within 
these countries, bringing the IDSR guidelines, including those of the laboratory system, 
to the peripheral levels (provincial, district, health facility and community) remained a 
challenge. The authors suggest stronger integration of activities related to IDSR by 
donors at the national level in an effort to strengthen implementation at lower levels. A 
higher level of technical coordination and integration by ministries of health within their 
respective countries was also recommended [ 4 7). The report concludes that a need exists 
for capacity building at the peripheral levels through proven mechanisms of training, 
supervision and feedback. Recommendations for health authorities were aimed at 
strengthening activities at the peripheral levels by assuring that technical materials are 
18 
printed and widely distributed, on-site training is provided, and evaluations of the IDSR 
core indicators are performed. The importance of strengthening community level 
surveillance activities was emphasized [ 4 7]. 
Nsubuga et al. (20 1 0) conducted an evaluation of four African countries 
experiences' of implementing IDSR during the period of 1998-2005 [39]. The 
evaluation was comprised of the collection of data related to the IDSR core indicators and 
qualitative data collected at the national and in some cases the regional level by means of 
interviews of key informants (Kis) in order to gain the perspective of actors and 
stakeholders. A reported limitation of the evaluation was the lack of data from the 
district level and below from which to draw conclusions. The authors conclude that 
further investigation at the lower levels is needed. 
Rumisha et al. (2007) found that poor communication and other factors at the 
health facility level had impeded full implementation. The authors did not, however, 
delve deeply into factors leading to poor communication and other barriers. Similarly, 
the WHO report (2003) mentioned above stated a need for capacity building at the 
peripheral levels and recommended the strengthening of community level surveillance 
activities and the link between laboratories at different levels. The report called for 
capacity building at the lower levels by means of training, supervision and feedback but 
did not provide specific solutions to "gaps" that exist at the "periphery" (community and 
health facility). 
The PHRPlus report written by Abt Associates, Improving performance of IDSR 
at district and facility levels: Experiences in Tanzania and Ghana in making IDSR 
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operational (2006), is likely the most complete documentation ofthe implementation 
process in Ghana available. The repoti describes the measures taken by the Partners for 
Health Reformplus project (2000-2005) to support implementation in the Northern, 
Upper East, and Upper West regions of Ghana and select regions of Tanzania [ 17]. 
This valuable report provides insight into the strengths and weaknesses of IDSR 
implementation, a methodology for assessing and improving IDSR, and 
recommendations that can be applied in Ghana, Tanzania and beyond. The report 
describes three essential components or determinants of performance: technical; 
organizational/workforce; and workforce performance (Figure 2). The importance of 
providing routine attention to the three determinants was expressed in the report as the 
following: "Implementers are reminded that they must look for and resolve obstacles to 
performance in all three areas. This can be done by ensuring that assessment and ongoing 
support activities are designed to address all three types of determinants." As a 
foundational component of the IDSR strategy, it is assumed that the countries have most 
ofthe basic technical elements ofthe strategy in place (technical standards, information 
system design, data collection forms, technology, etc.). In the absence of strong 
organizational and workforce capacity, IDSR will not perform optimally, according to 
Abt Associates. Both of these determinants were found to be sub-optimal in Ghana and 
Tanzania at the time the repmi was written. 
A study was conducted in the Northern Region of Ghana in the year 2000 to 
measure the effectiveness oftransitioning the Guinea worm village volunteer into the role 
of CBS volunteer. The study included interviews of community members, volunteers, 
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Figure 2. Determinants of disease surveillance and response system performance1 
Technical determinants: 
Technical standards, information system 
design, data collection forms, and technology 
Organizational/Workplace 
determinants: Structure, leadership, 
processes/procedures, resources, 
incentives, clear roles and responsibilities 
IDSR 
Performance 
Workforce performance: 
Knowledge, skills, and motivation of 
individuals working in the system, and 
organizational culture 
1Adapted from Franco LM, Setzer J, Banke K. Improving performance oflDSR at district and facility levels: Experiences in Tanzania and Ghana in 
making IDSR operational. The Partners for Health Reformplus Project, Abt Associates Inc. 2006 September. 
zonal coordinators and health system personnel. The community member/villager 
informant allowed for the inclusion of IDSR stakeholders at the level of data collection 
that have no official role within the IDSR infrastructure in an attempt to better understand 
the local perception of the program and knowledge of their contribution to protecting the 
health of the community. In addition to key informant interviews (KIIs), a documents 
review was conducted within health facilities and the volunteer register was examined 
[18]. The methodology of this study informed the development ofthe present evaluation. 
No journal articles focusing on the evaluation of community level surveillance 
were identified by a Pubmed search using the terms evaluation and community-based 
surveillance. A number of reports, evaluations and conference abstracts, however, 
provide evidence supporting the use of CBS as a means to increase the sensitivity of 
surveillance in countries where gaps at the local level lead to incomplete reporting within 
health facilities. The results of an evaluation of a measles surveillance system in 
Cambodia presented at the 3i11 National Immunization Conference of the CDC in 2003, 
serves as an example of what is available within the public domain. The evaluation 
found that many of the measles outbreaks detected by communities had not been detected 
or reported by health facilities [ 48]. Although the concept of CBS is well supported and 
often recommended by researchers, little has been documented about the evaluation of 
performance, especially explanations of poor performance. Additionally, no studies are 
available in the public domain specifically related to the evaluation of community-based 
surveillance within the context ofiDSR. 
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CHAPTER 3: Research Design and Methods 
Data were collected in three regions/provinces (Greater Accra, Eastern, and Northern 
regions) located within one of each of the three major epidemiologic zones (Coastal, 
Middle Belt and North) (Figure 3). The number of study sites was limited to one sub-
district within each region/province due to constraints related to logistics, time and 
Figure 3. Map: The three research regions 
budget. Regional and district surveillance 
offices responsible for the sampled 
sub-districts were visited prior to 
conducting interviews within facilities 
and communities. In order to gain 
insight into gaps in performance 
associated with supervision and 
distance from the next higher level of 
administration, sub-districts sampled 
did not include those in which the 
district administration pertains and the 
districts sampled did not include those in which the regional administration lies. A 
convenience sample of communities was taken with the assistance of representatives 
from the Public Health Division of the GHS located in each of the three regions. The 
choice of study sites located in urban, semi-urban and rural areas was intended to shed 
light on how characteristics associated with different levels of public health services and 
demographics may affect surveillance. The community sampled in the Northern Region 
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was a rural community of 200 people mainly subsiding on agricultural activities. In 
contrast, the community in the country's capital city, Accra, is densely populated, more 
economically diverse, and lies in the proximity of many services. The two remaining 
communities, each with populations of over ten thousand, share some of the 
characteristics of the aforementioned communities as they are best described as 
transitional. They both lie on the periphery of a large metropolitan area and are 
comprised of many individuals who have migrated from rural areas. Probability 
sampling was not utilized due to the fact that public health services were not expected to 
vary greatly within a district or sub-district and the availability of resources for travel was 
limited. With the exception of one sub-district in which two facilities were visited, one 
health facility, the most central and/or the location of a disease control officer, was 
visited in each of the sub-districts. 
Data collection, analysis and inte1pretation 
Klls and a review of documents were conducted including IDSR stakeholders 
from the national through community levels. An interview methodology was employed 
that shares some of the attributes of those described within the studies conducted by Maes 
and Zimicki (2000) [18] and Nsubuga et al. (2010) [39]. Kls fall into three broad 
categories or groups corresponding broadly with roles, responsibilities, and location 
within the disease and respond matrix. The first group included representatives from the 
NSU and the surveillance units of the three regions and districts. The second group 
comprised SDHT members. The third group ofKis was made up of community 
members. A records review was conducted within the health facilities to obtain data to 
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measure core functions, support functions, and quality/outputs. The CBS volunteer 
Community Register for Vital Health Events in Ghana (2006) was also reviewed. 
Six questionnaires and one document review guide were utilized by the data 
collector: a CBS supervisor questionnaire; a CBS volunteer questionnaire; a CBS 
community member questionnaire; three sub-district and health facility surveillance 
questionnaires each corresponding with a different set of IDSR core functions; a 
questionnaire for the national, regional and district; and a guide to collecting documents 
and materials from the health facility/SDHT. 
Evaluation measures 
The measures employed by the evaluation were derived from three unique sources 
related to surveillance evaluation or more specifically to IDSR. CDC's Updated 
Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems [ 44] provided a 
methodology for evaluation of a surveillance system which included a description, 
assessment of usefulness, and measurement of system attributes. The Technical 
Guidelines (2002) of Ghana provided the activities that should be carried out at the 
community and health facility levels to achieve the seven core functions of IDSR. The 
third methodology was derived from the Determinants of Disease Surveillance and 
Response System Performance model found within the PHRPlus report (2006). The 
specific measures utilized by this evaluation have been organized below under each of 
these three methodological sources. 
The CDC's Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance 
Systems provided a tool to describe IDSR and measure its needs and performance. The 
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CDC recommends that an evaluation provide a description of the strategy and an 
evaluation of usefitlness. The guidelines include system attributes (simplicity, flexibility, 
data quality, acceptability, sensitivity, representativeness, timeliness and stability) which 
may be evaluated as means to measure the performance of a surveillance system. All but 
sensitivity and representativeness were measured by this evaluation due to the availability 
of data and objectives of the evaluation. Global definitions for usefulness and each of the 
attributes are given below followed by the corresponding measures created for this 
evaluation. 
Usefulness provides an indication of how well a strategy is working to detect new 
epidemics, identify changes in patterns of disease or health conditions that warrant public 
health action, and support the advocacy for resources [44]. The following measures were 
utilized to evaluate usefulness: 1) Has the health facility detected a new epidemic through 
data analysis? Which examples can be provided?; 2) Does the health facility have 
documentation of analysis that has shown a disease or condition that has exceeded the 
epidemic threshold or that occurred in locations where it was previously absent or that 
occurred more often in a population group than previously or that presents unusual trends 
or patterns?; 3) Can the SDHT or health facility provide examples of when they had 
advocated higher levels for resources or other help needed to undertake public health 
action?; 4)Have diseases listed under community surveillance within Ghana's Technical 
Guidelines been detected and repmied by CBS volunteers? 
The simplicity of the structure and operation of an information system refers to 
having as simple a system as possible that can achieve its intended objectives [ 44]. A 
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flow chart for the IDSR strategy was designed to demonstrate each of the levels and 
actors involved in data reporting. Acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) case investigation was 
used to describe the process required to collect and report data on a rare disease. 
Flexibility refers to how adaptable a system is to changing information needs and 
operating conditions with few additional resources[44]. Consideration ofjlexibility is 
particularly important at this time as the second edition of Ghana's Technical Guidelines 
has recently become available. Flexibility was assessed by asking health facility 
personnel to describe how difficult it would be to add additional diseases and health 
events to those the health facility was currently reporting taking into consideration the 
resources that will be needed. They were also asked to describe the steps that would have 
to be taken to add each additional disease or health event, how long it would take to add 
each one, and the obstacles that might be encountered. CBS supervisors were asked how 
difficult it would be to add additional diseases and health events to those now being 
reported by the volunteers and the steps that would have to be taken to add each 
additional disease or health event. Similarly, CBS volunteers were asked how difficult it 
would be for them to report on additional diseases or health events in addition to those 
listed in the CBS register. 
Data quality reflects the accuracy and completeness of form completion [ 44]. 
The following were employed to assess data quality within the facility and community: 1) 
a review of registers to observe completeness of columns; 2) a review of completeness of 
responses on all weekly (CDl) and monthly (CD2) reporting forms for the previous three 
months; 3) a sample from the registers of all malaria cases 5 years of age and older 
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compared with those reported on the monthly reporting form (CD2) for the same period; 
4) a simple count of unanswered or incomplete entries within the CBS register; 5) and a 
comparison of a sample of the six diseases and conditions found within the CBS register 
for the last one year compared to that recorded by the supervisor or supervising health 
facility. 
Acceptability refers to the willingness of actors within the surveillance system to 
participate in data collection and reporting [ 44]. Facility personnel were asked to rate the 
responsibility of identifying and reporting diseases and health events compared with their 
other duties (Likert scale). Completeness of reporting forms and registers, and timeliness 
of reporting were assessed as part of the records review. Completeness and timeliness of 
reporting by CBS volunteers were evaluated by questioning supervisors and reviewing 
CBS books. Volunteers were asked to speak on why they continue volunteering, how 
much longer volunteers think they will continue volunteering, and the different ways they 
benefit from being a volunteer. CBS supervisors were asked to describe how CBS has 
helped them to do their work and if they think that surveillance in general has been 
improved by its implementation. Community members (chemical sellers) were asked 
their opinions about the benefits of CBS and their participation. 
Timeliness reflects the speed between steps in a public health surveillance system 
[44]. Since no data were available within the facilities themselves to measure timeliness, 
district disease control officers were asked to report the frequency that weekly and 
monthly reports were received by the reporting deadline from the sampled health facility 
or sub-district within their jurisdiction during the three-month period of October through 
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December 2011 . 
Stability refers to the availability and reliability of the system[ 44]. More 
specifically it can be understood in terms of the uninterrupted availability and reliability 
of minimal essential resources, personnel , transportation, communication, and funding 
needed to support the function of the IDSR strategy. To measure stability ofiDSR within 
the sub-district, the following questions were asked of the SDHT: Does the facility ever 
experience a stock-out of reporting forms; why is the stock not adequate; what access 
does the SDHT/health facility have to reliable transportation methods including fuel 
resources; what access does the health facility have to means of communication 
(telephone, facsimile, radiophone, Email, others); what surveillance related activities and 
functions of the SDHT/health facility are not operating properly due to a lack of funding 
or other resources? CBS supervisors were asked what problems they have had with 
obtaining supplies necessary for CBS. Volunteers were asked if they had a problem 
getting a new annual register at the beginning of the year. 
The following are the measures created to measure the performance of the seven 
core functions (identify, report, analyze and interpret, investigate, respond, provide 
feedback, evaluate and improve the system) of the community level ofiDSR as described 
within the Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in 
Ghana, 2002 [21]. Identify is carried out by employing simple case definitions to 
identify priority diseases or conditions in the community. Volunteers were asked to give 
the case definition of each of the diseases listed in the CBS register. Each picture within 
the register was pointed out when asking the question . Community members and 
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community leaders were asked if they were knowledgeable of the CBS volunteer in their 
community and to describe any communication they had received related how to identifY 
and report priority diseases. 
The report core function of the community level can be described as the 
community's ability to know which health events to report to the local health facility and 
when to report them. Report was measured by asking disease control officers, clinicians, 
or community members responsible for providing supervision to the CBS volunteers 
which diseases and events volunteers and community members have reported to the 
health facilities . The review of the CBS register included the observation of how 
frequently supervisors have signed the register. Volunteers were asked how often they 
present their registers to a supervisor. 
Analyze and interpret at the community level is conducted by involving local 
leaders in observing and interpreting disease patterns and trends in their community. To 
measure the performance ofthis function sub-district CBS supervisors were asked to give 
examples of when data had been shared with the community from which it originates. 
Community leaders were asked to describe any activities in which they were involved 
during which the observation and interpretation of disease patterns and trends found 
within their community were discussed . 
Investigate can be described as supporting case investigation activities such as 
informing the community of the problem, case finding, and collecting specimens. 
Community members (chemical sellers) and CBS volunteers where asked to describe 
their awareness of investigation, case finding, and the collection of specimens that had 
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taken place within their community. 
Respond at the community level of IDSR can involve the following: assisting 
health authorities in selecting response activities; participation in response activities; 
mobilization of community resources appropriate for a response activity; and performing 
community health education. Community level Kls (chemical sellers, community leaders 
and volunteers) were asked to describe or give examples of how their community has or 
could perform each ofthe above actions. 
Provide feedback relates to the provision of information about reported cases and 
prevention activities to community members. Community level Kls were asked to give 
examples of when the health facility shared with them the community's health data or the 
outcome of prevention activities. 
Evaluate and improve at the community level refers to the process of determining 
if public health action took place as planned and to evaluate the community response to 
the public health action. Sub-district CBS supervisors and community Kls were asked to 
give examples of activities conducted to evaluate and improve CBS. 
The following measures are those which were employed to measure the 
performance of the seven core functions of the health facility level ofiDSR as described 
within the Technical Guidelines [21] . The core function identify includes the following 
activities: use of standard case definitions to identify priority disease conditions; use of 
local laboratory capacity to diagnose suspected cases; use of standard protocols to 
process laboratory specimens; and the collection and transport of clinical specimens for 
laboratory investigation. Kls within health facilities were asked to: a) demonstrate a 
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booklet, poster, or other material within in the facility which lists the priority disease case 
definitions; b) give the definition of AFP; c) give examples ofwhen the local laboratory 
capacity to diagnose suspected cases had been utilized; d) explain the standard protocol 
to process an AFP specimen. 
The report function includes the reporting of case-based information for 
immediately notifiable diseases, summary data to the district level, and laboratory results. 
The performance of the report function at the level of the health facility was measured by 
asking health facility personnel to provide documentation of cases eligible for immediate 
notification that had been reported to the next higher level and give an account of 
epidemic prone diseases which had been previously reported by any means including 
telephone. Faci lities were asked to provide copies of completed CDl and CD2 forms for 
the last three repmting months prior to the evaluation visit. Informants at each level of 
the strategy were asked the requirements for submitting the CDl and CD2 forms as well 
as reporting deadlines. Health facility personnel were asked to provide laboratory sample 
documentation sent to and received from the next higher level. In the absence of 
documentation, health facility personnel were asked to give an account of all laboratory 
samples that had been previously sent to the next higher level. They were also asked to 
explain the procedure for receiving the results. 
The analyze and interpret function includes the preparation and update of graphs, 
tables and charts to describe time, person and place for reported diseases and conditions. 
Health facilities are expected to identify any disease or condition that meets the criteria 
for immediate reporting by means of standardized data analysis procedures and inform 
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the district level immediately. The analyze and interpret function was evaluated by 
asking health facilities to provide examples of their use of graphs, tables and charts for 
surveillance purposes. Informants were asked to provide examples of the use of the 
following data analysis procedures: 
a. Identification of a trend change in laboratory data. 
b. Detection of a new epidemic through data analysis. 
c. Established alert and epidemic thresholds for epidemic prone diseases. 
d. Identification of diseases that have: exceeded the epidemic threshold; 
presented unusual trends or patterns; occurred in locations where it was 
previously absent or more often in a population group than previously. 
The investigate function at the health facility level involves the following 
activities: investigation of reported outbreaks; collection, packaging, or storing and 
transport of specimens for laboratory testing; use of investigation and laboratory results 
to confirm an outbreak; processing and recording of laboratory results; and provision of 
laboratory results to the district health management committee, clinical staff and patient. 
This function was evaluated by asking informants to recall previous participation in 
outbreak investigations; describe the procedure for processing an AFP specimen; give 
examples of reported use of investigation and laboratory results to confirm outbreaks; 
provide accounts of the processing and recording of laboratory results of priority 
diseases; and give examples of the provision of laboratory results to the district health 
management committee, clinical staff, and patient. 
Respond entails the treatment of cases and contacts according to standard case 
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management guidelines and the use appropriate infection control measures. The facility 
level carries out public health response with the district level, mobilizes community 
involvement and advocates for resources. A number of measures were used to evaluate 
the performance of respond within facilities and sub-districts. The records review 
included a preview of the available standard case management guidelines within 
facilities. Infonnants were asked to describe the facility's preparedness to conduct a 
public health response and infection control measures. They were also asked to give 
examples of the facility's attempts to advocate upper levels for resources and community 
involvement in outbreak response. Informants at the district and sub-district levels were 
asked to give the status of outbreak committees (epidemic management committees.) 
The facility level is required to give feedback about the outcome of reported cases 
and prevention activities to community members. Both community and health facility 
level informants were asked to provide examples of feedback provided to community 
members. 
The evaluate and improve function can be described as the periodic evaluation 
and monitoring of surveillance and actions taken to improve the core functions of 
surveillance within the facility and community. Health facility personnel were asked to 
describe evaluation efforts that had been carried out by the facility and actions taken to 
improve readiness for timely response to outbreaks. The documents review included a 
request to see a monitoring and evaluation pl3:n. Additionally, health facility KI was 
asked to provide examples of efforts to monitor each of the following: 
1) Timeliness and completeness of reporting to the district level. 
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2) Interval between the sending and receipt of specimens/results. 
3) Quality of laboratory results. 
4) Supplies necessary for emergency situations. 
The following were employed to evaluate the three determinants of performance 
described within the PHRPlus report (2006) [17]. Measurements applicable to the 
determinants of performance previously described within the two methodologies 
described above (CDC evaluation guidelines and Ghana Technical Guidelines) have not 
been repeated here. 
The technical determinants were described and evaluated by asking informants 
from the national through the facility level to list alliDSR documents and technical 
materials ofwhich they had knowledge. Available documents were reviewed in an 
attempt to find mention of additional documents. An international consultant who had 
previously worked on IDSR in Ghana directed the researcher to PHRPlus report (2006), 
which lists many resources created for Ghana. 
Organizational and workforce determinants were evaluated by many of the 
measures described above under the other two major methodologies. In addition, health 
facility personnel were asked to describe who from higher levels of the GHS as well as 
individuals or organizations outside of the GHS have expressed an interest in the sub-
district level data and the function of IDSR. An account of any noteworthy shortage of 
resources was given. The records review provided a substantial amount of information. 
Workforce performance was also evaluated by many of the measures described 
above under the other two evaluation methodologies. Knowledge was measured, for 
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example, by asking health facility level informants to give the definition of AFP and the 
deadlines from weekly, monthly and quarterly reporting. CBS volunteers were asked to 
give the definitions of each of the priority diseases listed in the CBS register. 
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CHAPTER 4: Results 
During the period of March 2011- April2012, the following activities were 
performed: background interviews, pursuit of ethical review from the GHS and Boston 
University, procurement of letters of support for field work, logistical preparations, and 
travel within three regions (provinces) to collect data. Data were collected during the 
period of January 20 through March 8, 2012. 
A total of twenty-nine individuals were interviewed. A minority of Kls, all of 
whom came from the sub-district teams, were administered more than one questionnaire 
as these held more than on role within the strategy, i.e. sub-district disease control officer 
and CBS supervisor. One information officer from the national surveillance unit and ten 
disease control officers representing the regional (Eastern, Greater Accra, and Northern 
regions), district (Accra Metropolitan, Akuapim South, Ga West, and Npandai), and sub-
district (Aburi, Ashiedu Keteke, Kitari and Pokuase) levels were interviewed. Four 
community health nurses were interviewed within either a health center or a Community-
based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) unit. Community level informants were 
interviewed within the town ofPokuase and Bokum neighborhood (Accra) of the Greater 
Accra Region, the town ofKitari and village ofWassa wassa of the Northern Region, and 
the town of Aburi located in the Eastern Region. They included four CBS volunteers, 
four CBS supervisors (three GHS personnel and one volunteer zonal coordinator), four 
community leaders (assembly members and one village elder), and four community 
members. Each of the community members was an active "chemical seller" - the term 
used in Ghana for someone licensed to sell pharmaceuticals to the public. 
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A documents review, including clinic registers, reporting forms, and reports or 
other materials related to surveillance or laboratory results, was conducted within the 
Kom clinic in Aburi, the Ussher Polyclinic in the Ashiedu Keteke sub-metropolitan 
district, the Kitari health center of the Npandai district, and the CHPS unit and Mayera 
health center located in the Pokuase sub-district. Two CBS registers were reviewed. No 
CBS registers were available for review within the remaining two study sites. 
Description and usefulness of the strategy at the level of the sub-district 
Description of the strategy 
Figure 4 provides a general description of the strategy as given by national, 
regional, and district officials when asked to describe the process and structure for 
reporting a suspected case of AFP. The following can be applied to any of the diseases 
eligible for immediate reporting with little modification. Feedback generally follows the 
same structure in reverse order. Additional elements contributing to the description can 
be found throughout the paper including Tables 1, 2 and 3, and below. 
Usefulness of the IDSR strategy at the sub-district level 
One of five facilities sampled reported having detected a new epidemic through 
data analysis. One of the five facilities, in which a disease control officer is posted, 
reported detecting a disease or condition that had exceeded the epidemic threshold. The 
same facility could provide examples of when the district was informed of diseases that 
presented unusual trends and patterns. None of the facilities, however, could provide 
examples of diseases or conditions that had occurred in locations where previously absent 
or more often in a population group than previously. Facilities were able to provide very 
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Figure 4. Flow chart of the process required to collect and report one suspected case 
of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) 
A CBS volunteer or clinician who has identified a 
suspected case notifies the sub-district position in 
charge (sub-district disease control officer or 
clinician). In some cases the district may be notified 
directly . 
The district level officer is notified by the sub-
district. The sub-district disease control officer (or 
district) takes two samples twenty-four hours apart 
and transports them to the district along with the 
required paperwork. 
A district disease control officer transports the 
sample to the region. 
The sample and paperwork is received by the 
Deputy Director of P .H. or the Regional Disease 
Control Officer. The regional lab checks the quality 
ofthe specimen in some regions. 
The region sends the sample to the Noguchi 
Memorial Institute for Medical Research located 
within the University of Ghana in Legon, Greater 
Accra Region. 
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few examples of when the higher levels had been advocated for resources, especially to 
undertake public action. Examples of advocacy came almost exclusively from disease 
control officers. 
Two of four CBS volunteers reported having ever identified and reported a 
disease or condition. The volunteer interviewed in the urban sub-metro, had reported 
suspected cholera, tetanus, and measles cases to the health facility in the past. The 
volunteer interviewed in the rural community of the Northern Region reported one case 
of suspected Guinea worm in the past. Equally few examples of CBS volunteer reporting 
could be provided by supervisors. An outbreak of cholera (2006) was reportedly detected 
by CBS in a sub-district where a disease control officer supervises the volunteers directly. 
Neonatal tetanus (2005) and Buruli ulcer (20 1 0) have been accurately identified by 
volunteers in the same area. 
Attributes of the strategy at the community and health facility levels 
Simplicity: Figure 4 above includes the personnel and offices involved in the collection, 
reporting, and submitting a laboratory sample. Although this procedure can be 
considered "simple", a more detailed look at this procedure in the discussion section 
provides evidence ofthe unnecessary expenditure of fuel, human resources, and time for 
the processing of one such laboratory sample. 
Flexibility: Each of the sub-district team members interviewed reported that there would 
not be any difficulty associated with the addition of new disease categories, conditions or 
health events. They expected that the higher levels would make the necessary changes to 
the reporting forms and provide any additional materials and supplies which may be 
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needed and provide any instructions associated with changes in reporting. The most 
commonly rep011ed needs associated with the addition of new disease categories included 
a computer to store current and additional data stemming from new disease categories, 
funds to pay for photocopies of reporting forms, adequate staff (community health nurse 
or disease control officer), and an update of clinic registers. All volunteers and 
supervisors reported that it would not be difficult to add additional diseases and health 
events to CBS. It was frequently stated that volunteers would require training or a 
workshop on the new category. 
Data quality: All columns in all of the registers of each facility were found to be 
complete with the exception of a few observations of missing diagnoses in one facility 
and an example of no entries during a one month period another. Missing entries were 
most often explained by periods when the sole person knowledgeable of the recording 
procedure was ill or on vacation. Registers were generally in good condition and legible 
with a few exceptions. All boxes or lines of the monthly reporting forms (CD2) sampled 
were found to be complete in each ofthe five facilities. In two of the five facilities where 
weekly forms (CD1) are being used, all responses were found to be complete with the 
exception of missing weekly dates and geographic information for one month in one of 
the sampled facilities . Three facilities were found to have underreported malaria cases in 
individuals five years of age or older on monthly reporting forms by 5%, 7%, and 25%. 
The remaining two had over rep011ed by 10% and 16%. It was observed that the 
inclusion of non-eligible cases under five years of age may have been responsible for 
some of this error. Suspected cases that have not been confirmed as malaria, designated 
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as "? Malaria", and cases formally diagnosed and presumably included on a reporting 
form from an earlier period, as indicated by "malaria rev " or "malaria review ", may 
also have been mistakenly recorded on the form. 
The epidemiologic reporting sheets which serve as an intermediate step between 
the register and repmiing forms in some facilities were found to have some terminology 
which did not correspond with the standard case definitions. The "Diarrhea with blood 
(shigella)" classification serves as a good example of how the language on the locally 
created epidemiologic reporting sheets could cause confusion. "Diarrhea with blood 
(shigella)" was found to be referred to as "dysentery" by all of the health workers 
questioned. A diagnosis is also noted as "dysentery" within the diagnosis column of 
clinic registers and on the locally created epidemiologic reporting sheets mentioned 
above. Another noteworthy aspect of the local epidemiologic reporting sheet is a lack of 
some of the categories or details required for the reporting of some priority diseases. 
Viral haemorrhagic fever and lymphatic filariasis, for example, were not included 
amongst the diseases listed on the local epidemiologic reporting sheet of one facility 
evaluated. In other instances the disease classification corresponded with that of IDSR 
but sub-categories or other details required of the standardized IDSR reporting forms 
were missing. The Technical Guidelines, for example, make the distinction between 
"diarrhea with severe dehydration in children < five years of age" and "diarrhea with 
some dehydration in children < five years of age". The epidemiologic repmiing sheet 
used by one facility, for example, lists only "diarrheal diseases". Similarly, the 
epidemiologic sheet in the same facility requires no detailed information for the category 
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of"Pneumonia". The Technical Guidelines recommend reporting "Pneumonia in 
children < 5 years of age" and "severe pneumonia in children < 5 years of age". In a 
second facility , the data on the facility's epidemiologic reporting sheet did not correspond 
with that found on the CD2 form due to the fact that the CD2 contained data from more 
than one facility. 
Both of the CBS registers available for review had many unanswered or 
incomplete entries. One of the two had no new entries half-way through the last available 
register (2010) . No data were available to make a comparison of a sample ofthe six 
diseases and conditions found within the CBS register for the last one year compared to 
that recorded by the supervisor or supervising health facility. 
Acceptability: Health facility personnel rated the responsibility of identifying and 
reporting disease and health events compared with their other duties as "more important" 
or "much more important". Completeness of registers and monthly reporting forms 
(CD2) was generally satisfactory (see Data quality above) . It is important to note that 
clinicians are responsible for reporting in two of the three facilities where the weekly 
reporting form (CDl) was not being used. Timeliness was found to be satisfactory. 
One supervisor reported that the relationship between the health facility and the 
community is less strong than it was before they lost the participation of the volunteers 
four years ago. He cited a lack of interest on the part ofthe community as one reason 
why CBS is not functioning. Other health facility informants reported that CBS has 
helped them to do their work and that it has helped to improve surveillance in general. 
However, some community leaders and all ofthe community members (chemical sellers) 
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had no knowledge of CBS. Two of four ofthe volunteers interviewed who no longer 
possessed registers were both located in the Greater Accra Region. One reported that 
volunteers in his community have abandoned their CBS responsibilities altogether. His 
supervisor was no longer keeping a CBS log and he reported that the facility had not been 
working with CBS for four years. In the two communities where the volunteers did have 
registers, the quality of the data was found to be very poor. One volunteer ' s register had 
never been signed by a supervisor and had no entry beyond mid-20 10. The volunteer 
indicated that his was the last register remaining in the community of those distributed 
during the original training session. 
Timeliness: According to the district level officials responsible for the two facilities that 
routinely submit paper based weekly reports (CDl), data were submitted on time 70-
80% and 86% of the time. Timeliness of weekly reporting was not obtained for the 
remaining three facilities as weekly data are submitted exclusively by phone or reporting 
forms are submitted after weekly data has been reported by telephone. Four of five 
(80%) of the facilities had reported monthly data (CD2) on time during the months of 
October, November and December 2011. 
Stability: With few exceptions, facilities were found to have the minimum necessary 
forms to perform IDSR reporting (integrated case-based reporting form, line-listing form, 
case-based reporting form for AFP, CDl, and CD2.) Stock-outs of reporting forms occur 
rarely. Four of five facilities reported having an adequate supply of forms for at least the 
next three months. The fifth reported having an adequate supply for the subsequent 
month. Stock may not be adequate at times since some facility level personnel may have 
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to rely on personal funds to replenish reporting forms and other official documents. The 
Standard Case Definitions, very important to the function ofiDSR at the facility level, 
were missing in all but one facility. 
Although a lack of motorcycles, vehicles, and fuel was frequently mentioned by 
sub-districts, the minimum transportation resources necessary for case investigation or 
outbreak response were found to be available. Sub-districts do not have adequate access 
to transportation for routine activities, such as supervision, however. 
With the exception of one sub-district health center with access to a landline 
telephone, mobile phones are the only means of communication for the health facilities 
beyond sending messages by a third party traveling between facilities or sub-district and 
district. All facilities had adequate cell phone coverage with the exception of the most 
remote site in which health workers had to find a suitable connection elsewhere within 
the village from which to make calls. Text messaging from cell phones is reportedly a 
frequent means of communication between some districts and sub-districts. 
Although reportedly not ideal, sub-district disease control officers did report 
having supplies to package and transport an AFP specimen. Clinicians, where no disease 
control officer was present, expected the district to handle specimen collection and bring 
supplies when the need arises. Four of five facilities did not have some or all of the 
minimum materials for creating and maintaining analysis documents including graph 
books, paper, pencils or computers. 
Two facilities reported not having an emergency stock of urgent drug and 
treatment supplies to respond to epidemic-prone diseases. Similar to specimen 
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collection, it is expected that the district or another higher level will supply these items 
when an outbreak occurs. 
In most cases, CBS registers had not been given to the volunteers for a number of 
years. Per diems, which motivate volunteers to conduct their activities, were found to no 
longer be given in most sub-districts . 
The seven core functions of IDSR- community-based surveillance 
In addition to the findings provided below, Table 4 summarizes the findings and 
conclusions of the community level by core function. 
Identify: Two out of five volunteers gave the correct definition of AFP, meningitis or 
neonatal tetanus. Three out of five gave the correct definition of measles. All gave the 
correct definition of Guinea worm and cholera. The definitions of deaths and births were 
also known by all. Some uncertainty surrounded "unusual events". 
None of the community members, all chemical sellers, knew a CBS volunteer or 
had been exposed to a message related to how to identify and report diseases and 
conditions via posters, newsletters, announcements or other means. Community leaders 
were more likely to know of the CBS volunteers but also had received little or no 
information related to how and what to identify and rep011. 
Report: A sub-district disease control officer reported that the volunteers have correctly 
identified diseases or conditions that have been reported to him approximately fifty 
percent of the time. CBS supervisors provided very few examples of diseases, conditions 
or events that have been reported by volunteers. One sub-district received reports of 
neonatal tetanus (2005) and Buruli ulcer (20 1 0) from volunteers . Cases of diarrhea had 
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been reported a number of months prior to the evaluation in a second sub-district in 
which Guinea worm surveillance is strong. The same facility received reports of Guinea 
worm and measles within the last few years. Community member informants report 
never having reported any diseases, conditions or health events in any of the four sub-
districts. Supervisory signatures were found in the CBS register (20 11) in one of four 
sub-districts sampled. Registers in the remaining three sub-districts had not been 
presented to the health facility by volunteers or checked by GHS personnel for a number 
of years. 
Analyze and interpret: Two sub-districts reportedly had held meetings with the CBS 
volunteers a number of years ago to review data. Three others reported no regular 
provision of data to the community beyond that which may be given during outbreaks. 
Assembly members reported having received some data at meetings held by the district 
for non-surveillance purposes. Local leaders reported that they are not routinely involved 
in the observation and interpretation of disease patterns and trends found within their 
communities. Some had received data during and following an outbreak response. 
Investigate: Community members (volunteers or community leaders) in three of four 
sub-districts sampled were knowledgeable of an investigation that took place during the 
cholera outbreak (2011). There was no evidence that community members or volunteers 
had been actively involved in case searches or other investigation activities. 
Respond: Although a number of volunteers expressed that their communities were not 
prepared for an outbreak, evidence from the cholera outbreak (2011) response 
demonstrates the success of communities (and the GHS) in responding to the epidemic. 
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Table 4. Summary of the evaluation findings and conclusions of the seven core functions of the community level 
Core Function Conclusion Notes 
CBS registers found to be outdated or unavailable; community members were not familiar with CBS 
1.0 Identify Non-functional volunteers; community leaders were not knowledgeable of objectives of CBS; volunteers were not able 
to give all of the definitions of the CBS priority diseases; CBS was functioning in one of five 
communities sampled. 
Recent (within three months of evaluation) supervisory signatures were found in the register evaluated in 
2.0 Report Non-functional one community; vo lunteers had not reported any suspected priority diseases within the one year period prior to the evaluation in four of five communities; community members with a stake in the community 
health, i.e., traditional healers, have not been sensitized to identify and report. 
3.0 Analyze and Community leaders are likely to receive information re lated to their community's surveillance data Non-fu nctional during or following outbreaks only; community members receive information even less frequently; very Interpret few examples could be given by communities of meetings held to discuss health information . 
4.0 Investigate Functional Community members expressed an awareness of case investigation and related activities; no account of 
opposition to case investigation on the part of communiti es was given by informants of any level. 
Anecdotal evidence from the response to the cholera outbreak demonstrates strong community 
5.0 Respond 
participation; the urban community creates add itional challenges which may deserve more attention of 
Functional the GHS in anticipation of future outbreaks; untapped resources, such as the chemical seller and others 
with a stake in the community's health, could be valuable additions to the response mechanism in all 
community types. 
Feedback is most likely to be provided to communities in the form of positive laboratory test results or 
6.0 Provide Functioning at a during outbreaks only. There is little evidence that feedback is provided routinely or during meetings 
Feedback minimum with the community. 
SDHT informants report that they have not been encouraged or instructed to provide routine feedback. 
7.0 Evaluate and Functioning at a Reportedly performed by the GHS post-response; no evidence of the evaluation or improvement of 
Improve the minimum routine CBS activities was found ; communities have not met to di scuss the improvement of CBS 
System (outbreak only) amongst themselves or with SDHTs. 
Each ofthe communities described various methods employed within their local area for 
reaching community members during a response. A number of respondents mentioned 
that a gon-gon (gong) has been beaten to gather people early in the morning to inform 
them of health education messages during an outbreak. The most rural community with 
fewer residents simply employed house-to-house visits in the past. Only the urban 
community described difficulty with getting people's attention by simply calling them to 
gather to provide them with health education messages. Urban households reportedly do 
not welcome volunteers who come door to door without a monetary offering. Durbars in 
this community will only be attended by the community members if dance entertainment 
and loud speakers with music are provided as incentives to gather. It noteworthy to 
mention that none of the four chemical sellers (pharmaceutical vendors) interviewed, 
including the informant in the urban community, reported having been ever asked to 
participate in an outbreak response by the GHS or community leadership. 
Provide feedback: Facilities reported that they had not been instructed by higher levels 
to provide regular feedback to communities. In three out of four communities, routine 
feedback on facility or CBS data had reportedly not been provided. No feedback related 
to CBS registers was found to be provided by districts to the sub-districts or by sub-
districts to communities. If feedback had been provided to communities it was only 
given during outbreak response. It is most likely given in the form of positive laboratory 
results for immediately reportable diseases, such as AFP, given to directly to the case and 
their family members. In one sub-district, a health facility reported holding quarterly 
meetings with communities to review health information. A volunteer in the same sub-
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district reported, however, that the community does not receive regular information from 
the health facility. Volunteers reported receiving some information during trainings or 
other meetings held at the district, such as, annual meetings. This information was not 
usually specific to their communities, however. In communities where a representative 
of the GHS participated in quarterly meetings with the assembly member and community 
leadership, ongoing outbreaks or the provision of health services were most likely to be 
discussed. All ofthe community members interviewed (chemical sellers), with the 
exception of one, reported that they had never received information from a volunteer or 
leader regarding illness that had been identified in the community. 
Evaluate and improve: Communities repmted having met during and following an 
outbreak response, reportedly on a weekly basis, to discuss public health action taken by 
the community. None of the four communities had ever met to discuss the improvement 
of CBS independently or in the company ofrepresentatives ofthe GHS, however. No 
evidence of evaluation and improvement of the overall function of the strategy or seven 
core functions ofthe community level were found. 
The seven core functions of IDSR- health facilities 
The following are the results of the health facility evaluation organized by core 
function . A summary of findings and conclusions are provided within Table 5 below. 
IdentifY: None of the personnel of the five facilities sampled gave the complete or correct 
definition of AFP. Minor errors in the case definition of AFP given by health facility 
informants included failure to mention "sudden (within three days) onset ", "< 15 years 
of age ", and "any person of any age in whom the clinician suspects polio ". More 
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serious errors included naming unrelated signs and symptoms and/or failing to include 
"paralysis " or an equivalent description thereof within the definition given. No standard 
case definitions were available in any form (23 Priority Diseases Case Definitions 
booklet, Technical Guidelines (2002) or case definition fact sheet) in four out of the five 
sampled facilities. 
Report: Both of the sub-district disease control officers provided documentation of 
immediate reporting to the district level. None of the three remaining facilities in which 
clinicians were in charge of surveillance had similar documentation to provide, however. 
One facility reported using case-based forms during a recent cholera outbreak but no 
copies were available for review at the time of the interview. Other facilities reported 
that districts are informed by phone and no records are kept locally. 
No suspected epidemic prone diseases were investigated in 2011 from one sub-
district health center serving a population of over ten thousand. Evidence from another 
facility suggested that clinicians in this pmticular sub-metro facility may not be actively 
communicating information on diseases eligible for immediate reporting. Measles 
diagnosed by a physician but not reported, for example, had been found in a register by 
the disease control officer during monthly data extraction. 
Regional and district level officials reported that all health facilities , including 
CHPS, are required to send CD 1 in paper form to the next higher level. Two of five 
facilities complete and send CDl weekly forms to the district level. A third facility 
reports weekly data to the district by phone only. Two facilities (one of which is a 
CHPS) were not submitting the CDl and may have not been reporting in any form on a 
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weekly basis. The two sub-district disease control officers reported that none of the 
CHPS within their jurisdictions were submitting weekly reports (CDl) in any form 
(including by phone). 
All of the facilities and sub-districts sampled are submitting a CD2 monthly form 
to their respective districts. The evaluation did not access the monthly reporting 
compliance of facilities not visited within the sampled sub-districts. One sub-district 
disease control officer, however, reported that none of the CHPS in his jurisdiction are 
submitting the CD2. Anecdotal evidence and observations made during the evaluation 
suggest that some sub-districts do not collect data from more peripheral health facilities 
within their jurisdictions, i.e. CHPS. 
Most laboratory testing of suspected cases is perfonned by one of two national 
laboratories. Sub-districts are most likely to be informed of laboratory results from the 
district disease control officer once the results have made their way back through the 
surveillance infrastructure. All sub-districts reported that only positive results of 
suspected cases investigated within their jurisdiction have been provided to them. 
Results are normally given by phone. Negative lab results are rarely if ever 
communicated to the sub-district. 
Analyze and Interpret: The two health centers where disease control officers were posted 
had graphs, tables, and charts posted on the wall of the surveillance unit office for some 
of the priority diseases. Malaria and cholera graphs and a distribution map for cholera 
were posted in one office. Additional analysis documents were kept on a desktop 
computer including malaria, HIV, hepatitis, schistosomiasis, and Guinea worm data in 
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Table 5. Summary of the conclusions and findings of the seven core functions of the facility level 
Core Finding Notes Function 
Few examples of suspected case investigation (laboratory samples) were provided by the health facilities; no 
Functioning at laboratory sample records were avai lable; clinicians report deferring to districts for the col lection of samples; 
1.0 Identify a minimal standardized case definitions of priority diseases were available in one of five facilities only; evidence was 
level. found within registers of priority diseases which had not been identified or sent for laboratory testing; identify 
was strongest where a disease control officer was posted. 
Few records are available of immediately reportable diseases, conditions or events reported to the next higher level; 
Functioning at most faci lities are not submitting a CDl form (weekly reporting); informants report that some peripheral faci lities 
2.0 Report a minimal (CHPS, for example) are not submitting the CDI and CD2 (monthly reporting) at all; the CD2 was found to have 
level. been submitted routinely within the three months prior to the evaluation by all facilities sampled; some facilities 
reporting (CD I) only by phone; report was strongest where a disease control officer was posted. 
Functioning at Tables, charts and graphs were found in the facilities where disease control officers are located; only one HF level 3.0 Analyze 
a minimal informant (disease control officer) could provide evidence of using data analysis to detect changes, trends or 
and Interpret level. outbreaks; clinicians were found to be performing very little or no data analysis. 
4.0 Functioning at Sub-districts in which a disease control officer is posted are more likely to perform outbreak investigation; clinicians 
Investigate a minimal are more dependent upon the district to perform investigation; few records oflaboratory samples sent for testing (to level. confirm an outbreak) were available at the time of the evaluation at the level of the health faci lity. 
The response during the 2011 cholera epidemic provides evidence that sub-districts have the capacity to respond in a 
5.0 Respond timely and efficient manner; informants report that response committees are fimctioning for the most part- they are Functional. more likely to have met more recently in areas where there has been an outbreak; case management guidelines were 
not available in three of five facilities. 
Feedback in the form of positive priority disease laboratory resu lts is likely the most frequent form of feedback 
Functioning at provided by districts to faci li ties and facilities to communities; negative laboratory results, data analysis, 6.0 Provide prevalence data and routine data reports are usually not provided to the community ; information which is 
Feedback a minimal received may not be transmitted beyond the community members who receive it first; no regular mechanism level. (bu ll etin or memo) for providing data specific to the sub-district or health faci lity was found to have been 
distributed by districts or other leve ls. 
7.0 Evaluate Generally Very litt le evidence exists of periodic monitoring and evaluation ofthe seven core functions by the sub-di strict 
and Improve non-
or facility levels. ~Syst~m functio nal. 
tables. The second sub-district health center had a bar graph posted on the wall that 
included under-five malaria, diarrhea, measles, malnutrition and pneumonia by year. A 
hand drawn spot map with the location of cholera, yaws, TB, and Buruli ulcer cases 
posted on the wall of this office cannot be considered useful as it was from a number of 
years ago and no date or other data beyond case plots were indicated. 
Very little or no analysis is being performed in sampled facilities where clinicians 
are responsible for surveillance. No evidence was found of the plotting the number of 
cases and deaths of epidemic prone diseases on graphs, tables or charts. 
None of the five facilities was able to provide evidence of the identification of 
disease that had occurred in locations where it was previously absent or more often in a 
population group than previously. 
One of five facilities, where a disease control officer was responsible, was able to 
provide evidence of the following: 
e. Identification of a trend change in laboratory data. 
f. Detection of a new epidemic through data analysis. 
g. Established alert and epidemic thresholds for epidemic prone diseases. 
h. Identification of diseases that have exceeded the epidemic threshold or presented 
unusual trends or patterns. 
Investigate: All of the sampled facilities (5) reported some level of participation in 
outbreak investigation. Disease control officers reported having more of a role in 
investigation than clinicians; however, each reported having had experience with the 
collection, packaging, storing and transport ofpriority disease specimens. Whereas the 
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disease control officers have confirmed outbreaks with laboratory results in the past, 
clinicians responsible for surveillance reportedly rely on the district team to perform 
sample collection, processing and results reporting tasks. 
Very few examples of the collection of laboratory samples of priority diseases, 
whether performed by the sub-district or upper levels, were provided by the informants, 
however. None ofthe five facilities had records of laboratory results within the facility. 
The following verbal accounts of case investigation were provided: yellow fever samples 
were collected and sent for testing in September 2011 (no results had been received); five 
H1N1 samples were sent in April and May of2010 by a sub-district health center; a rural 
facility reported having sent a Guinea worm sample in 2010 and TB samples in 2011 
(results were received in both instances). A lack of funds for transportation and 
availability of vehicles can reportedly deter from the prompt investigation of suspected 
cases. One disease control officer estimated that only about half of suspected cases can 
be visited on some days as the shared vehicle he had access to must be returned to the 
health center after a half day's use. 
Evidence of suspected cases eligible for investigation that had not been sent for 
laboratory testing was found during the records review. Cases of "Diarrhea with blood 
(shigella) ", for example, one of Ghana's six epidemic prone diseases, found in the 
registers of three of the five facilities during the records review had not been sent for 
laboratory testing. Two of these facilities did not report these cases in any form to the 
next higher level. 
Due to the nature of the surveillance structure, districts will most likely be aware 
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of laboratory results before a sub-district. Facilities are likely to only receive positive 
results. The two sub-district health centers, which have disease control officers, reported 
providing results to the clinical staff and patients. Three facilities, which lie in sub-
districts where disease control officers have not been posted, reported having less of a 
role in the provision of laboratory results. 
Respond: Faci lities provided examples of participation in outbreak response including 
extensive collaboration with communities, citing most frequently actions taken during the 
cholera outbreak (2011). Sub-districts provided very few examples of when they had 
advocated higher levels ofthe health system for outbreak response materials, however. 
The two sub-district health centers had comprehensive standard case management 
guidelines available within their facilities. On the contrary, the three peripheral facilities 
had very limited or no standard case management guidelines available. Four of five 
facilities reported having been provided with instruction or training related to infection 
control measures . Three of five facilities reported that they are prepared to conduct 
public health response. Outbreak committees had recently reorganized after a number of 
years of inactivity in response to the cholera outbreak. Others have not met since the last 
local outbreak a number of years ago. Some districts reported that sub-district 
committees are stronger than those of the district level. Others have reported the opposite 
experience. It is likely that the community level is the least active, however. 
Provide feedback: Feedback is likely to be provided most frequently regarding 
information related to suspected cases and prevention activities carried out during 
outbreaks. Little or no feedback on routine reporting has reportedly been received by 
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communities from SDHTs, however. Positive laboratory results are the most likely form 
of feedback that community members receive from health facilities or upper levels. In 
some cases, however, no one beyond the cases themselves or family members may be 
informed. As was mentioned above, it is likely that negative lab results are almost never 
provided to health facilities and communities. Albeit very infrequently, community 
members may receive data during durbars or volunteer training sessions. 
Evaluate and improve: Although informants provided some anecdotal evidence of 
informal evaluation during outbreaks, none of the facilities and sub-districts had 
documentation of a plan for evaluation and monitoring or documentation of evaluation 
activities conducted in the past. 
o There is very little evidence that sub-districts and facilities are monitoring the 
timeliness and completeness of reporting to the district level, including that of the 
peripheral facilities that report to them. 
o One of five facilities reported monitoring the interval between the sending and receipt 
of specimens/results (sub-district disease control officer). 
o Facilities and sub-districts are not currently set up to monitor the quality of lab 
results. 
o Facilities and sub-districts are not likely to monitor the number of supplies to set 
aside during an emergency situation. Informants reported waiting for the upper levels to 
evaluate their needs and make appropriations. 
o One of five facilities reported having taken action to improve readiness for timely 
response to outbreaks. 
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Determinants of IDSR Peiformance 
The following findings are organized under the three determinants of performance 
as described within the PHRPlus report (2006): technical ; organizational and workforce; 
and workforce performance. Tables 6 and 7 provide syntheses of the results for the 
community and health facility levels respectively. 
Technical determinants: 
A comprehensive collection of appropriate documents and forms has been 
produced and tested within the country. The Community Register for Vita/Health Events 
in Ghana (2006) [ 42] provides communities with a means of recording vital health events 
and diseases, births, deaths and immunizations. A health staff visit log sheet within the 
register provides for documentation of supervisory visits made by a zonal coordinator or 
a GHS supervisor. The CBS Supervisor Log, maintained by a zonal coordinator or GHS 
supervisor, is used to aggregate data from the community registers within a sub-district or 
zone. A Training Module for Community-Based Surveillance Workers and Guidelines 
for Community-Based Surveillance System in Ghana are listed within the Community 
Register (2006) as companion documents. 
The following documents, forms, and guidelines created by the GHS and/or 
partner organizations include those that are required or could be utilized by the sub-
district level. 
o Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in Ghana, 
2002. 
o Standard Case Definitions for 23 Priority Diseases for Integrated Disease 
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Surveillance and Response (I.D.S.R.), May 2002. 
o Fact sheet on epidemic prone diseases with standard case definitions and reporting 
requirements for clinicians (PHRplus report, 2006). 
o Reporting forms: Case investigation forms; line listing forms; CDl (weekly reporting 
form); CD2 (monthly reporting form); single disease case-based forms (influenza, AFP, 
diarrhea (GAR), and Guinea worm); and an integrated case-based form (yellow fever, 
measles, meningitis, and shigella). 
o Rumor booklet/log. 
o Letters and memos with information on specific diseases of interest that may include 
prevention information, alerts, or other supplementary information. 
o Health Facility Analysis Book (PHRplus report, 2006). 
o Facility level IDSR training package materials including a pre- and post-test 
evaluation, post workshop assignment, facilitator's guide, participants' guide, and a 
handbook for IDSR at the facility level. Developed by PHRplus and the NSU for the 
three northern regions in 2005 (PHRplus report, 2006). 
o Wall poster with reporting requirements and deadlines (PHRplus report, 2006). 
o Supervision guides (PHRplus rep01i, 2006). 
o Standard treatment guidelines (also referred to as the "blue book"). 
Organizational/workforce determinants: 
Essential structure: Sub-district health teams were found to have a strong relationship 
with community leadership and community volunteers. Existing communication 
channels and modes of providing incentives to communities during activities such as 
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Table 6. Summary of the determinants of performance for the community level 
Level of Minimum Minimum Minimum 
strategy technical Organizational/ workforce Final evaluation 
workforce determinants detet·minants performance 
0 The minimum technical determinants have been met. Some materials, documents 
and resources may no longer be in circulation, however. 
0 Basic volunteer and supervisory documents/materials are no longer availab le 
within sub-districts. 
0 The Northern Region can serve as an example of how strong leadership at each 
level , the provision ofT &Tor "motivation" for volunteers, and clarity of roles 
and accountability have created strong CBS. These elements were lacking in each 
of the other sites. 
0 The exclusion of volunteers from the benefits other volunteer activities has proven 
to have a negative impact on motivation of and acceptability by community 
members. 
Community Satisfactory Not yet achieved Not yet 0 
Community members, especially those involved in the community's health have 
achieved not been incorporated into community level surveillance as described within the 
Technical Guidelines (2002). 
0 The CBS volunteer approach is not feasible due to financial and administrative 
limitations of the GHS. 
0 The culture of some populations, such as the urban neighborhood, may require 
more effort on the part ofGHS to develop unique solutions to gain the 
participation of communities in survei llance and response activities. 
0 Both clinicians and disease control officers could benefit from training and 
documented instructions focused on the supervision of community level 
surveillance and response. 
0 A mechanism for sustaining the supervision of the community level is lacking at 
all levels. 
Table 7. Summary of the determinants of performance for the healt h faci lity level 
Level of Minimum Minimum Minimum Final evaluation 
the technica l organizational/ workforce 
strategy determinants workforce pe1·fo1·mance 
determinants 
o The minimum technical determinants have been met. Some 
valuable materials, documents and resources may no longer be in 
circulation, however. 
o Leadership at all levels focusing on the guidance and motivation 
of clinicians is lacking. 
0 Standard case definitions and essential instructional documents 
were not found within facilities. 
o No evidence of monitoring and evaluation plans was found for 
the faci lity level or within facilities . 
0 Supervision guidelines were found to be lacking. 
0 Some peripheral facilities, including CHPS, not producing 
0\ 
....... 
weekly and monthly reports on paper or by phone in some cases. 
Health Some determinants Some determinants 0 Some facilities may not be knowledgeable as to how to budget Satisfactory for surveillance activities. 
facility lacking or weak lacking or weak o The only access to communication in many cases is the personal 
cell phone. Having to pay out-of-pocket for phone calls may 
serve as a disincentive. 
0 Knowledge of procedures essential to surveillance may only be 
held by one individual of the SDHT. 
0 Knowledge of the seven core functions of IDSR and the standard 
case definitions is low amongst clinicians. 
o Little evidence of the "bottom up" approach to implementing the 
strategy within faci lities including the provision of training 
within facilities was found. 
0 Districts are likely not monitoring the quality of the seven core 
functions within facilities in their jurisdictions. 
0 Facilities were not found to be held accountable for the 
performance of the seven core functions. 
immunization campaigns has helped sub-districts to mobilize community participation 
with relative ease for response and other health related activities. The number of 
individuals who may be motivated to participate varies by community, however. Many 
creative solutions to a lack of transportation and limited access to communication have 
been developed in each ofthe areas sampled. 
Although not ideal , private taxi buses or "tro tros", personal bicycles, personal 
cell phones, and oral communication provide the main means of transpmtation and 
communication. Schools and churches had reportedly been used to hold community 
meetings related to outbreak response. Enthusiastic and capable personnel maintaining 
regular communication with the higher levels were found in all ofthe facilities visited. 
Each of the facilities visited was found to be in good physical condition, manned by at 
least two health workers at any one time, and actively providing services to patients. 
Additional details can be found under Stability in Chapter 4. 
Management Capacity: Each of the sampled facilities was observed to have the minimum 
necessary number of capable personnel necessary for the maintenance of the seven 
functions of IDSR. 
Leadership: A strong leadership capacity was observed amongst district, sub-district and 
communities in general. This capacity was not always applied to the management and 
improvement of the IDSR strategy, however. Varying levels of demonstrated leadership 
were observed amongst sub-district and district team members ranging from a strong 
dedication and commitment to community surveillance through total neglect. 
Supervisory signatures found within the last available annual register (20 11) in the sub-
62 
district where the Guinea worm initiative had supported community level surveillance 
suggests that registers had been checked relatively recently. In the remaining 
communities, however, community leaders, community members, and volunteers 
reported little or no perceived interest of the GHS or NGOs in the performance and 
improvement of their communities' surveillance. Community leaders reportedly have not 
discussed the improvement of community surveillance amongst themselves or with 
community members. 
Processes and Procedures: Some processes and procedures for surveillance were found 
in each of the facilities visited. As is described throughout the results section, the number 
of essential procedures operating and their quality varied greatly across sub-districts. 
Districts and regions report having contact lists of all facilities and districts respectively. 
Processes and procedures were lacking at the community level, however, in all 
but the Nmthern Region sub-district where volunteers were found to have a regular 
schedule for CBS activities. None of the sub-district teams were found to have 
supervisory plans for community level surveillance. 
Access to resources: The documents, forms, and guidelines listed under the Technical 
Determinants section above provides an overview of the policy, instructional documents, 
and reporting forms which were created to guide the implementation and management of 
the IDSR strategy in Ghana. The following is a comprehensive account of the documents 
and forms corresponding with the aforementioned list which were found during the 
records review: 
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0 Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in 
Ghana, 2002. One ofthe sub-district disease control officers was in possession of the 
Technical Guidelines. None of remaining four facilities visited had this document. 
0 Standard Case Definitions for 23 Priority Diseases for Integrated Disease 
Surveillance and Response (ID.S.R.), May 2002. This booklet was not found to be 
available in any of the health facilities or the offices of sub-district disease control 
officers sampled. 
0 Fact sheets with standard case definitions and reporting requirements for 
clinicians (PHRplus report, 2006). A fact sheet was found in one health facility (CHPS 
unit). 
0 CDI form (weekly reporting) . This form was found in the majority of facilities 
and sub-districts. 
0 CD2 form (monthly reporting). This form was found to be available within all of 
the sampled facilities in duplicate. 
0 Quarterly reporting form. A limited number of quarterly forms were found in a 
few of the facilities sampled. If a facility was in possession of a quarterly reporting form, 
it was likely to be only one of the numerous forms in circulation. One facility, for 
example, had a copy of the quarterly leprosy reporting form . 
0 Case-based reporting form - Influenza. This form was not in the possession of 
most facilities sampled. 
0 Case-based reporting form - AFP. This form was in the possession of the 
majority of facilities. 
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0 Case-based reporting form - Guinea worm. This form was available in the 
majority of facilities. 
0 Case-based reporting form -Neonatal tetanus. This form was found within most 
facilities. 
0 Line-listingform. All facilities were in possession of blank line-listing forms. 
0 Integrated case-based reporting form (yellow fever, measles, meningitis, and 
Shigella). This form was found within all facilities. 
Iii Rumor book/log. Facilities are not in possession of these. Where available, 
however, only outdated out-of-use copies were found. 
Iii Official letters. All facilities and sub-districts possessed letters from the district or 
higher levels including information on specific diseases of interest, which may include 
prevention information, alerts, or other information. 
Iii Health Facility Analysis Book (PHRplus report, 2006). None of the facilities were 
in possession ofthis book. Only one informant of all levels of the strategy mentioned 
having knowledge of it. 
Iii Facility leveliDSR training package materials developed by PHRplus and the 
MOH for the three northern regions (PHRplus report, 2006). These materials were not 
referred to by any level (national, regional, district or sub-district). None of these 
materials were found during the sub-district and facility documents review. 
Iii Wall poster with reporting requirements and deadlines (PHRplus report, 2006). 
Not found to be posted in any of the sub-districts or facilities. 
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0 Supervision guides (PHRplus report, 2006). Not reportedly in the possession of 
any of the facilities or sub-districts. 
0 Community Register for Vital Health Events in Ghana, GHS, 2006. Copies of the 
register were found in two of five communities evaluated. Each ofthe copies reviewed 
was outdated. All of the volunteers interviewed reported having had a copy at one time 
in the past. 
0 Community-based surveillance register data log (CBS supervisor). One disease 
control officer and one zonal coordinator possessed outdated files related to CBS (two of 
five sub-districts) . 
0 Training Module for Community-Based Surveillance Workers (mentioned within 
the Community Register for Vital Health Events in Ghana, 2006). None were available 
within any of the facilities and sub-districts sampled. 
Iii Guidelines for Community-Based Surveillance System in Ghana (mentioned 
within the Community Register for Vital Health Events in Ghana, 2006). None were 
available within any of the facilities and sub-districts sampled. 
Informants at the sub-district level reported a reduction in the availability or in 
some cases quality of resources during the last few years. Annual CBS registers have not 
been made available across the sampled sub-districts. No evidence of the bicycles 
distributed to some of the volunteers during the implementation of the strategy could be 
found. Fuel to make supervisory visits to volunteers and peripheral health units and 
perform case investigation had reportedly been reduced. Landline phone access has been 
discontinued in two of the sampled facilities. Computers for surveillance activities were 
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found to be lacking in all but one sub~district. One of the districts visited did not have a 
dedicated surveillance computer. 
Incentives: Volunteers reported the importance of the per diem or travel reimbursement 
("T &T") in providing motivation to perform their surveillance duties. A reduction or 
elimination of "T &T" was reported across sub-districts. Health facility personnel did not 
report the benefit of financial compensation for costs associated with case investigation. 
In some cases, volunteers are losing income when not present at their place of 
work (most are self-employed and/or vendors). Some have even mentioned having to use 
personal funds to pay for transpmiation to make visits to community member's homes as 
a volunteer. The loss of income or use of personal funds to carry out volunteer duties, 
whether for transportation, phone credit or other means, serves as a disincentive. 
Although secondary to the financial incentive, volunteers offered examples of 
other benefits they receive from volunteering. One volunteer, for example, stated that the 
best thing about CBS is that it "opens your mind." Speaking about why he continues to 
volunteer, he says, " ... to become a volunteer is not easy work, it brings challenges. It 
helps to become known in the community and allows me to study a lot [about health] ." 
He added that volunteering is useful to him as it helps him to acquire [social capital] and 
therefore the chance to gain profitable opportunities within the community when they 
arise. He says that people will think of him first if there is work to be given. He intends 
to mention his volunteer role when applying for a job one day and will ask for a letter of 
recommendation or certificate of participation from the GHS. 
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Roles within the strategy: The role of district and sub-district disease control officers as 
managers or facilitators of community level surveillance was most evident in the 
Northern Region. Roles were less clear within communities. In many instances, 
informants, including the volunteers themselves, were not able to distinguish between the 
role of the CBS volunteers and those of other health related volunteer positions. 
"Volunteer" was most often used to describe the volunteer role for which the most recent 
training has been given or motivation distributed, i.e. vaccinator or CBA. This 
phenomenon was not observed, however, where CBS volunteers have been provided with 
routine incentives and kept interested by means of rotation through non-CBS volunteer 
trainings and other opportunities (Northern Region). The role of traditional healers, 
TBAs, chemical sellers or other members of the public with access to the community as 
described within the Technical Guidelines has not been established. At the facility level, 
the role of the sub-district disease control officer was found to be very well understood 
by Kls holding this position. The role of the clinician within the IDSR strategy was not 
very well understood by the clinician themselves, however. 
The role of the disease control officer, however, was not completely void of 
variability related to accountability and responsibilities. In one region, a district disease 
control officer did not have the same information about their role in CBS as that which 
was reported by his supervisor. The regional disease control officer reported that all 
districts should be promoting and maintaining CBS including the attachment of one 
volunteer to each CHPS unit. On the contrary, the district disease control officer reported 
that CBS had been piloted a number of years ago, had failed and has been since been 
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suspended. He therefore did not see it as his role to hold sub-districts accountable for the 
maintenance of CBS. Another district level official responsible for surveillance was not 
aware of the status of the volunteers in his jurisdiction and was unable to provide 
information related to who was in charge of volunteers within the sub-district sampled 
within his district. Not surprisingly, the sub-district team sampled within the same 
district was not able to fully explain who was in charge of community surveillance at the 
local level. 
Responsibility and accountability: Accountability for the supervision and collection of 
community level data was only observed in the Northern Region district. 
Responsibilities related to IDSR were not as well understood by health facilities and sub-
districts where clinicians were solely responsible for surveillance. The reporting 
requirements of districts varied greatly. In one district, facilities and sub-districts were 
not required to complete any reporting forms beyond the CD2. In another district, the 
sub-district health center was expected to regularly fill out all required reporting forms, 
including the CD 1. The other facilities within the same sub-district reporting to the 
health center were not required to fill out any reporting forms, however. Sub-districts 
were found to not be accountable for carrying out the core functions of routine data 
analysis, feedback to the communities, or evaluate and improve. In some cases it 
appeared that no accountability for performance of the identifY, report and investigate 
functions was expected. 
Workforce performance: 
Knowledge: CBS volunteers were not generally able to provide the goals of CBS, stating 
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that it had been a long time since they had heard them. Some gave the goals of other 
volunteer initiatives stating things like "to reduce teenage pregnancy". The zonal 
coordinator and CBS volunteer in the Northern Region, where the Guinea worm initiative 
has a strong presence, were very knowledgeable of the purpose and goals of CBS, 
however. The community leader interviewed in the same sub-district was able to give the 
objective as well. Most of the community leaders within other areas, however, were not 
aware of CBS or its goals. None ofthe community members (chemical sellers) in any of 
the sub-districts had knowledge of CBS or its purpose. 
One ofthe volunteers gave the correct definition for all case definitions of the 
diseases and conditions. The knowledge of the others was more variable. Details of 
volunteers' knowledge of the case definitions can be found under Identify of the The 
Seven Core Functions of IDSR - Community-based Surveillance in Chapter 4. 
Sub-district disease control officers had the greatest level of knowledge of the 
seven functions ofiDSR of the health facility and the overall function of surveillance. 
Clinicians responsible for surveillance were generally knowledgeable of the identify, 
report, and respond functions . They were less likely to have basic knowledge of the core 
functions analyze and inte1pret, investigate, provide feedback, and evaluate and improve 
the system. Clinicians had difficulty giving the correct case definition of AFP . Evidence 
of a lack of understanding of how to perform reporting duties was found in three facilities 
where clinicians were responsible for reporting. In one example, a nurse responsible for 
extracting data from registers for routine reporting, and a supervisor responsible for 
overseeing her surveillance reporting activities were unable to describe or agree amongst 
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themselves which malaria cases were to be extracted from the register for inclusion on 
the monthly reporting form (CD2). When asked to reproduce the number of cases 
reported to the district for a certain period in the past, they were unable to arrive at the 
same number of cases that had been originally repmied. A discussion ensued between 
them about which cases were reportable and the correct procedure to produce monthly 
data. Similar discussions were stimulated during the documents review in the other two 
facilities where clinicians were also solely responsible for producing repmis. 
Although SDHT members possessed basic knowledge of routine precautions to be 
taken with all patients, knowledge of standard precautions for attending to febrile patients 
was lacking by most informants. All were found to be knowledgeable ofthe reporting 
deadlines. 
The following is an account of select training content reportedly received by SDHTs' 
within the last twelve months: 
a. Use of case definitions: Received by three of five facilities. 
b. Safe handling of specimens: Received by two of five facilities. 
c. Collection and reporting of data: Received by three of five facilities. 
d. Analysis and interpretation oftrends: Received by two of five facilities. 
e. Use ofthresholds for action: Received by one of five facilities. 
f. Supervisory skills: Received by one of five facilities 
Motivation: Motivation amongst both volunteers and SDHTs to perform duties related to 
CBS was found to be low with the exception of the Northern Region sub-district. Some 
volunteers remarked that they may be less motivated to perform their duties if not 
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accompanied by supervisors or colleagues, such as during the collaborative activities that 
occur during national immunization days. Having something to report (suspected cases) 
was mentioned as a motivation to make entries in the volunteer register. Other 
motivations reported by volunteers include a sense of duty to one ' s community, the 
opportunity to learn about healthcare, and the business or employment opportunities that 
may arise through their participation. As was mentioned above, financial compensation 
is especially important to volunteers. 
The availability of resources to perform surveillance related tasks was the most 
frequently mentioned factor associated with motivation for health facility Kls . In 
addition to sharing the volunteers' interest in helping community members and protecting 
their families from disease, SDHTs described the ethic of"doing one's duty" to protect 
the population as sufficient motivation for performing their surveillance responsibilities. 
Verbal moral support was the most frequently mentioned form of motivation sought by 
health system personnel. A number of respondents expressed the desire to receive a 
simple "thank you" or "pat on the back" from time to time from superiors . 
Organizational culture: A strong team-oriented atmosphere amongst GHS personnel was 
observed across sub-districts. SDHTs appear to have a good working relationship 
amongst themselves and with the communities that they serve. All of the volunteers 
reported that they believed that the sub-district health team appreciated their work. Little 
evidence of relationships or partnerships with non-GHS institutions or other 
organizations working at the local level that have an impact on IDSR was found. 
Some volunteers were observed to be overburdened by the numerous volunteer 
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initiatives to which they had been assigned. Some were in the possession of a large stack 
of partially completed volunteer books and registers collected from various trainings . 
The opposite experience of others was found to be equally as limiting. These volunteers 
were told that they could not participate in new volunteer initiatives, such as the 
community health agent (CBA) scheme, due to the fact that they had already been 
assigned as CBS volunteers. 
In rural areas, volunteers who work on farms may leave the village where they 
serve for up to a month for agricultural activities. Volunteers from all types of 
communities may be absent during periodic travel for commerce or other reasons. 
The experience communities have had with development projects and NGOs can 
have a significant impact on the success of community level surveillance. Some 
communities may have become accustomed to collaborating only when a financial 
benefit is received. The homes in the urban site, for example, would only allow the CBS 
volunteer to enter if he offered something material or financial in exchange. 
One example of an organizational culture limitation was observed during a phone 
conversation between the region and a sub-district. The morale of the SDHT was 
reduced by the negative feedback received from the region after the collection of an AFP 
sample. The satisfaction the SDHT had initially gained from its hard work in procuring 
two AFP samples according to the standard protocol was quickly stripped away by the 
talking down it received from the region. When questioned as to why they were being 
reprimanded, they responded that they had not sent the samples with the "new" cased-
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based form. Ironically, they had never received this form from either the district or the 
regwn. 
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CHAPTERS 
Discussion 
CDC attributes: simplicity, flexibility, data quality, acceptability, timeliness, and 
stability 
The measures corresponding with those described within the CDC 's Updated 
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Surveillance Systems [44] allow for a general assessment 
of the functioning of the strategy. Evidence demonstrates that the IDSR strategy of 
Ghana has generally been implemented according to the technical guidelines and is 
functioning. 
With the exception of examples such as the complicated procedure for 
transporting an AFP sample (Appendix 5) found in one region, the strategy is relatively 
simple (simplicity). The strategy can described as havingflexibility. The training of 
personnel on new disease/condition categories would most likely require transport and 
other training-associated costs (meeting venue, meals, per diems). Kls mentioned the 
necessity of providing "motivation" or financial compensation to help volunteers start 
reporting on a new category as volunteer activity was low at the time of evaluation. In 
other words, the addition of new disease categories could be interpreted by communities 
as re-initiating CBS, a process that would require incentives for the volunteers. This 
approach may not be reasonable, however, as resources to support the basic activities of 
CBS were observed to be lacking at the time of evaluation. 
Assuming that an error of up to 20% over or underreporting is acceptable, only 
one facility can be rated as having poor data quality as indicated by the comparison of 
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malaria cases found within the clinic register and monthly reporting form (underreported 
by 25%) . It is important to point out that the two facilities demonstrating the greatest 
amount of discordance between the register and reporting forms, 16% and 25% 
respectively, have clinicians, as opposed to disease control officers, who prepare the 
reporting forms. Data quality could be improved by assuring that more than one 
individual is trained on record keeping procedures including clinic registers and reporting 
forms. 
Acceptability by those responsible for the strategy at the health facility level was 
found to be higher than that of Kls responsible for the community level, whether these 
individuals were from the GHS or the community itself. The volunteers interviewed, 
however, all of whom have served in numerous non-CBS health-related volunteer 
initiatives, describe volunteering in a very positive way. This high level of acceptability 
should be capitalized upon to implement the community level of the strategy as described 
within the Technical Guidelines and detect and respond matrix (Table 2). 
Monthly repmting can be described as being timely (timeliness) in all but one 
facility. Districts reported that sub-districts are reporting around the minimum level 
required (80%). The sub-district health center which was routinely late to repmt to the 
district had one public hospital within its jurisdiction which would not send its data by 
the deadline as the deadline fell before a hospital-wide data review meeting each month. 
Sub-districts such as this one should be empowered to advocate higher levels to intervene 
or create policy to address such issues. Performance of timeliness cannot be evaluated 
without considering completeness, however. Kls had reported that many facilities, likely 
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smaller peripheral ones, are not reporting regularly. More attention should be given to 
the core functions of IDSR within the smaller facilities as these have likely not been the 
focus during implementation efforts and could contribute to the detection of cases and 
conditions in more remote populations. 
Facilities were found to generally have the minimum elements necessary in place 
to sustain IDSR and can therefore be described as having stability. Further reductions in 
budgets for fuel, photocopies, and cellular telephone credit could serve to reduce the 
effectiveness of IDSR, however. 
The seven core functions of IDSR- community level 
The majority ofthe IDSR core functions ofthe community level were not 
performing at the minimal level required of the strategy. It is likely that the knowledge 
volunteers possess related to a limited number of case definitions and their use is directly 
associated with the frequency that certain diseases and conditions have been found in 
their area or the level of resources that have been put into the control or elimination of 
certain diseases, i.e. Guinea worm, in their district. 
It was observed that the strategy is working in areas where the Guinea worm 
eradication initiative has provided extra support. This evaluation cannot conclude, 
however, that the IDSR strategy of the community level is effective in Guinea worm 
focus areas for the detection, investigation and response of the priority diseases beyond 
Guinea worm. Additionally, although evidence of an attempt to implement a CBS 
volunteer component was found in most of the sampled communities, the strategy for the 
community level had not been implemented as described within the Technical Guidelines 
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(2002). Key community members, including chemical sellers, for example, had not been 
sensitized. The strategy of gaining the participation of" ... trained birth attendants, 
community or village health agents, or similar care providers, village leaders (religious, 
traditional or political) or school teachers, veterinaries or health extension workers, 
pharmacists, and traditional healers [21 ]" to actively identify and report suspected 
priority diseases had not been realized or attempted in any of the sampled communities. 
The community-based surveillance methodology has been demonstrated to be effective in 
developing countries especially in areas where logistics constraints exist [ 49, 50]. 
Although the CBS volunteer model may not be realistic for Ghana at this time, an effort 
to implement the community level of the strategy as described within the Technical 
Guidelines is warranted. 
Communities demonstrated an understanding and commitment to outbreak 
response. The community members of the urban community were repmtedly often 
reluctant to participate, however. Extra effort on behalf of the GHS may be necessary 
within this and communities with similar characteristics to provide health messages and 
garner community participation during outbreak response. Additionally, the chemical 
seller and other individuals with a stake in the community' s health could be valuable 
assets for the detection of cases and provision of health communication messages to 
customers during an outbreak response. 
Communities may be more willing to actively identify and report suspected 
priority diseases, conditions and events when periodically engaged to participate in 
analyze and interpret activities and provided with routine feedback related to their efforts 
78 
and local epidemiology. Likewise the employment of the evaluate and improve function, 
including the participation of community, would be beneficial to the sustainability of the 
community level. 
The seven core functions- health facility level 
The seven core functions of the level of the health facility, although varying 
greatly across the sampled sub-districts, can be said to be performing at the minimum 
required of the strategy. Improvements targeting a number of weaker performing aspects 
of the strategy could help to bring the strategy to the level of performance desired of the 
GHS . 
The records review provided evidence that not all eligible cases are being 
correctly identified. This phenomenon may be partly explained by the clinicians' level of 
knowledge of the case definitions. A number of health facility level Kls were not able to 
give the correct case definition of AFP, for example. This lack of knowledge may be 
associated with the absence of standard case definitions within facilities and inadequate 
training. Additionally, further investigation may demonstrate that facilities are more 
likely to identify and report diseases and conditions which have been given more 
attention by the GHS or ones that have appeared in their jurisdiction previously. Those 
which people have less knowledge of or exposure to may be missed and therefore 
underreported. The difference in performance ofthe identify functions found within sub-
districts and facilities where clinicians were responsible for surveillance compared to 
those where a sub-district disease control officer was posted deserves further 
consideration. An outbreak of cholera (20 11) in a sub-district where clinicians were 
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responsible for the strategy most likely only came to the attention of health officials when 
infected individuals stmting arriving at a district health center located in a neighboring 
sub-district. Neither of the facilities in the sub-district had identified or reported any 
cholera until the district launched an investigation. It is difficult to speculate how 
widespread this phenomenon is throughout the country, however. It would be useful to 
survey districts in which outbreaks have occurred to determine how effective the sub-
district level was in identifying and investigating cases early in the epidemic. The 
identify and report functions in sub-districts which have a disease control officers 
responsible for surveillance could likely benefit from closer scrutiny as well. This 
assumption is supported by the example of sub-district district disease control officer 
responsible for a population of over ten thousand people who had not reported any 
suspected cases of immediately reportable priority diseases in all of 2011. 
Empirical evidence allows for deeper understanding of the level of discordance 
between that which is recorded in the clinic register and reported to the district level. A 
similar level of error related to data extraction from clinic registers was found by both the 
present evaluation and a similar evaluation conducted approximately six years earlier. 
The PHRPlus repmt (2006) found that reporting forms reflected that which was recorded 
in facility registers 86% of the time in the three northern regions [17]. Similarly, none of 
the monthly forms reviewed by the evaluation accurately reflected the number of malaria 
cases found in clinic registers. The number of cases found in registers ranged from 86-
133% ofthat which was recorded on reporting forms. This observed over and under 
reporting could be due to factors related to errors made when data are taken from the 
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register or during subsequent steps in the reporting procedure. 
The additional step in the reporting procedure observed in some facilities could 
have an effect on data quality. Whereas some facilities were found to extract data 
directly from registers to complete the CD2 forms , others were found to be completing an 
epidemiologic reporting sheet including the aggregate of cases and deaths from which 
reporting forms were then completed. In two facilities where such forms were found it 
was observed that not all of the disease classifications or names corresponded with those 
described within the Technical Guidelines or the Standard Case Definitions for 23 
Priority Diseases. The discordance between the local classification of "dysentery" and 
the classification listed on official reporting forms, "diarrhea with blood (shigella)" , may 
be responsible for the observed failure of some facilities to report this condition. The 
national standardization of reporting procedures and all facility level forms, especially the 
epidemiologic reporting sheet in question, may help to eliminate discordance between 
registers and reporting forms and improve reporting in general. 
Additional evaluation may find that the practice of not requiring all facilities to 
submit weekly, monthly and qumterly reporting forms or keep a log may serve to reduce 
the performance of active surveillance within facilities. Similarly, not providing facilities 
with feedback on negative laboratory results may serve to decrease the perceived 
importance of actively looking for and reporting priority diseases. Regardless of the type 
of position responsible for surveillance and response, the facility level would benefit 
from sustainable access to the standard case definitions, standardized terminology for use 
in registers, standardized epidemiologic sheets, and reporting forms, and accountability 
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and incentives for identifying priority diseases and conditions. It may be noteworthy to 
mention that some countries in the region provide reimbursement for the transportation 
and expenses incurred by health facility personnel fi·om throughout the country who 
deliver samples to the national laboratory. This reimbursement may serve as a strong 
incentive for health workers to routinely carry out the identify, report, and investigate 
functions. A similar type or reporting incentive is not available to clinicians in Ghana. 
The PHRPius report (2006) found that 78% of facilities had performed any 
analysis of an IDSR disease and 70% of these analyses were current at the time of 
evaluation in 2005. Seventy percent had performed analysis for malaria. Less had 
performed analysis for measles, meningitis and Guinea worm [17]. Two ofthe five 
(40%) facilities evaluated by this study in 2011 were able to demonstrate any evidence of 
analyze and interpret procedures. The methodology and materials for the facility level 
described within the PHRPlus report (2006) can serve as a valuable resource to introduce 
the core function of analyze and interpret to facilities where it is not yet performing. 
Curiously few accounts and even less documentation of investigation are 
available at the sub-district level related to the collection and laboratory testing of 
suspected cases of priority diseases. Although evidence of investigation was provided, 
the facilities are highly dependent upon the districts to initiate and perform related tasks. 
Clinicians who are given more responsibility for surveillance and response procedures 
and made accountable for performance may become empowered to take on ownership of 
the seven functions ofiDSR within their respective facilities. Additionally, the provision 
of materials for sample collection and training on the collection and processing of 
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laboratory samples may serve to encourage more active identification and reporting of 
priority diseases. 
Although facilities provided accounts of epidemic response , sub-districts are 
likely to be very dependent upon districts for the initiation of response activities. Sub-
districts, for example, provided very few examples of when the higher levels had been 
advocated for response materials. Outbreak committees may only be motivated to meet 
when the GHS asks them to discuss an ongoing outbreak response. Committees would 
likely meet more regularly if the GHS requested periodic meetings. Consideration of one 
respondent ' s remark that stand alone outbreak committees may be more productive than 
those which are also the general health committees is warranted. Perhaps response would 
take place earlier in an epidemic if facilities were given the responsibility to take a more 
active role in detecting outbreaks and planning response activities with committees 
before outbreaks occur. 
Feedback from health facilities to communities rarely occurs. In the rare 
instances when it does occur, it is most likely to be in form of positive laboratory results 
during an outbreak investigation. Although SDHTs report that some prevalence data is 
provided at quarterly durbars, volunteer trainings, and child health clinics, no solid 
examples of the content provided during these meetings were provided. Community 
members, on the other hand, generally did not have any memory of receiving data 
specific to their village, town, or neighborhood. A policy of regularly sharing routine, 
case-based, and laboratory (positive or negative) data could serve to motivate 
communities to contribute to surveillance activities. 
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Facilities have little or no understanding of evaluation and improvement 
procedures. Sub-district level respondents report that the higher levels have not 
encouraged evaluation. Some simple guidelines for the sub-district level describing how 
and when to conduct evaluation is called for. Encouragement from higher levels to 
conduct and participate in evaluation could be also be beneficial. 
Determinants of performance: technical, workforce/organizational, and workforce 
performance 
The determinants of performance described by Abt Associates consist of three 
essential areas that must be satisfied to achieve IDSR performance. Of these, the 
technical determinants were found to be very adequate. Aspects of the remaining two, 
workforce/organizational and workforce performance, were found to be either lacking or 
missing. The most important observation related to the technical determinants was the 
fact that many of the valuable materials developed for the IDSR strategy of Ghana during 
the early implementation phase as described within the PHRPlus report (2006) were not 
mentioned by any ofthe informants from the national through the community levels or 
observed during reviews of records within facilities. A review by the NSU of these 
valuable materials described within the report is warranted. 
Some of the essential workforce/organizational determinants were found to be in 
place. Only those found to be lacking or in need of improvement are mentioned here. 
The management capacity was found to be adequate but in need of improvement. 
Observations made during site visits led the researcher to believe that ample human 
resources were available at the time of the evaluation for the management ofiDSR of the 
84 
health facility level. Unlike some other countries in the AFRO region which give the 
responsibility of health facility IDSR management exclusively to clinicians, Ghana's 
strategy has the additional position of sub-district disease control officer. This model has 
been relatively successful - IDSR is performing in the sampled sub-districts where 
disease control officers are posted. This model, however, may be responsible for the 
observed lower quality IDSR in some sub-districts. In addition to lacking a competent 
disease control officer, sub-districts "waiting" for the position to be filled were found to 
have a passive approach towards surveillance and response. This phenomenon may be 
related to a lack of accountability required from the district level in such instances and 
the expectation by facilities that districts will perform most functions of IDSR until a sub-
district disease control officer is hired. Health facilities may even be less knowledgeable 
of and empowered to carry out the seven core functions ofiDSR than their counterparts 
in countries where the sub-district disease control officer model is not pmt of the national 
strategy and clinicians have more of a stake in IDSR. 
Policies designed and strictly enforced by higher levels without consideration of 
the unique characteristics of districts and sub-districts may lead to less optimal processes 
and procedures at the level of the health facility. The flow chart for the collection and 
transport of one case of AFP found in Appendix 5 provides an example of how the 
regional policy that does not allow for flexibility regarding geographic and other 
differences amongst sub-districts can complicate the transport of specimens and create 
unnecessary expenditure of time and resources. In this particular example, a sub-district 
disease control officer who has been notified by a volunteer or CHPS unit makes a visit 
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to the home ofthe suspected case by motorcycle (up to 3 hours round-trip) to procure the 
first sample. The trip is repeated by the sub-district disease control officer within 24 
hours to prepare a second sample. A two hour one-way trip to transp01t the sample to the 
district is made on a rough unpaved road which has reportedly compromised the quality 
of samples in the past. Pending the availability of a district vehicle, the district disease 
control officer takes responsibility for transporting the sample to the regional office. This 
trip also entails a couple of hours of driving over a road that is mostly unpaved and 
difficult to pass during the rainy season. Upon receiving the sample, the regional office 
takes on the responsibility of transporting the sample to the Noguchi Laboratory located 
within the University of Ghana, Legon outside of the capital city Accra. The sub-district 
health facility that had originally packaged the sample is passed on the way. Thus, a two 
hour trip from the sub-district health center to the laboratory has been made into one that 
takes unreasonably more time, possibly a number of days, and resources. Additional 
factors including seasonal variability of road conditions and the availability of vehicles 
and personnel could lengthen the time to complete this procedure. Taking into account 
the numerous accounts of informants at all levels of the strategy expressing a lack of 
vehicles, fuel , and money, this procedure for transporting a specimen is unreasonable. 
The most noteworthy observation made related to access to resources concerns 
the disappearance of the tools developed during the implementation stage ofiDSR and 
the lack of essential tools expected to be found in all facilities , most notably the Standard 
Case Definitions. The PHRP!us evaluation conducted in 2005 in the three northern 
regions provides data with which select findings related to the availability of documents 
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and other technical materials can be compared. Please note that PHRPlus evaluation and 
this study only share one region in common (Northern Region) (Table 8) [17]. Some of 
the missing materials may not have been distributed widely or even implemented at all by 
the national level. Others may have been used during the last decade but have since 
disappeared or forgotten. Although most regional level disease officers did not share the 
opinion, one explicitly stated that no resources for surveillance were lacking at the sub-
district level. This statement, at least in this case, may indicate some level of discordance 
between the needs of the sub-district level and the knowledge or perception of the 
regional level. 
Table 8. The availability of documents within health facilities: A comparison with 
the findings of PHRPlus (2005) 
PHRPlus Evaluation within the 
(2005) Community and Health Facility (2011) 
Standard Case Definitions for 23 Priority Diseases 
for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response 80% 0% 
(JD.S.R.) , May 2002 
Facility level IDSR handbooks 60% 0% 
Log book of rumors and investigations 50% 0% 
Community-based surveillance summary forms 65% 20% 
Generic case-based forms 75% 100% 
Weekly reporting forms 100% 100% 
Monthly reporting forms 98% 100% 
The materials, lessons learned, and techniques employed during the 
implementation of IDSR within three northern regions beginning almost a decade ago 
could be helpful as Ghana implements its updated Technical Guidelines nationally. A 
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close examination of the PHRPlus report (2006) may be beneficial to both national and 
regional officials responsible for IDSR as it likely possesses some of the much needed 
solutions to the "gaps" mentioned often by those responsible for the strategy. The 
"bottom up" approach described within this report beginning at the facility level may be 
especially relevant considering the evaluation findings. The materials developed for 
training facility level personnel in the three northern regions referred to as the Facility 
LevelJDSR Training Package included a pre- and post-test and evaluation, post 
workshop assignment, facilitators guide, participant's guide, and a handbook for IDSR at 
the facility level. Job aids were also described that provided facility personnel with quick 
reference and visual reminders and reinforcement of roles as well as the responsibilities 
and skills required ofiDSR [17]. 
A reduction or elimination of incentives formally provided to volunteers was 
found to have had a profound impact on the performance of CBS. Volunteers who have 
served and/or who were currently serving in various volunteer capacities at the time of 
the study, including vaccinators during immunization campaigns, health educators and 
other health related volunteer roles, are usually also the person chosen to serve as the 
CBS volunteer. The inclusion of volunteers in each new (non-CBS) volunteer 
opportunity has served as one of the strongest incentives for CBS volunteers. The 
exclusion of CBS volunteers from new initiatives can have an equally strong impact on 
the long established relationship between the GHS and volunteers, however. CBS 
volunteers who are not invited to participate in non-CBS volunteer trainings, such as 
those recently held by the BCS initiative, can be made to feel alienated. Similarly, the 
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provision of bicycles by a new initiative that excludes the CBS volunteer has been 
reported as a disincentive. One sub-district, where volunteers outnumber the number of 
volunteer opportunities (CBS and non-CBS), has addressed this issue by rotating 
volunteers through trainings and new oppotiunities. 
Kls ofthe sub-district level were able to provide very few examples of when they 
advocated higher levels for needs associated with priority disease detection or response. 
Similarly, no examples of participation in evaluation activities were reported. These and 
other findings support the assumption that a top-down hierarchical IDSR structure in 
Ghana affords actors of the sub-district level with little opportunity to influence how 
IDSR is managed or make suggestions for improvement. Referring to the health system 
in Africa, Imhoff and Mathauer (2006) suggest that the institutionalization of the 
participation of health workers through the creation of opportunities for personnel to 
share ideas and suggestions for improvements and participation in decision-making on 
issues that concern their work and immediate work environment can create non-financial 
incentives [51]. Implementing such a policy in Ghana may serve as an economic solution 
to a number of the "gaps" of the sub-district level. 
Some difference was found between the description of the role of the sub-district 
disease control officer by the district level and that which was observed within sub-
districts. Of even greater concern is the finding that clinicians were unaware of their 
responsibilities within the strategy. Perry, et al. report how Tanzania took steps to assure 
that each of the activities or tasks listed under the IDSR core functions had a "champion". 
The detect and respond matrix was used to create the job descriptions for those charged 
89 
with carrying out IDSR activities [52]. It is likely that both health facility and 
community level of Ghana would benefit from the establishment of well-defined 
supervisory roles at the district and sub-district levels. Job descriptions of all actors 
involved in IDSR, including community members and clinicians, could be helpful in 
creating accountability and a greater awareness amongst staff of their role and 
responsibility within the IDSR strategy. 
Some informants had expressed that certain SDHT members who had been sent to 
district level trainings may not be the most appropriate position to receive surveillance 
related training. Perhaps individuals are chosen to attend trainings for the benefit of the 
per diem rather than the best fit technically. When this occurs it is less likely that these 
individuals will properly distribute the information they had received when they return to 
the facility . 
Biostatisticians working in larger sub-district health centers may have the 
potential to take on many surveillance data related tasks. This position and its potential 
for providing manpower to the strategy may be of interest to the country as Ghana 
increases the number of priority diseases, conditions and events and responsibly of actors 
within the SDHT with the release of the second edition of the Technical Guidelines. 
Some Kls reported that the volunteers had not been chosen by the community 
itself but rather the GHS. Individuals with personal connections to the GHS personnel 
may not be trusted by community members or concerned for the welfare of others . It is 
imperative that the community has a say in who represents them. 
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Responsibility and accountability within the IDSR infrastructure was found to be 
very variable. In at least one district there was some reported discrepancy related to 
whether the district or the sub-district had the responsibility of providing laboratory 
results to health facilities and communities. It has been reported that physicians may be 
reluctant to take on the task of reporting priority disease conditions to disease control 
officers because they are located lower than themselves within the medical hierarchy. 
Therefore, physicians may benefit from some additional sensitization related to their 
surveillance and response-related responsibilities. 
The following describes some areas were the workforce performance 
determinants can be improved. The low knowledge level of the CBS volunteers is not 
surprising considering the time that has lapsed since training was last provided to most. 
Some had reportedly not received training related to surveillance in approximately ten 
years. Lower knowledge and surveillance and response related performance of clinicians 
might be linked to the expectation of clinicians and district teams alike that sub-district 
disease control officers will one day be placed in each sub-district. Thus, there appears to 
be little urgency to prepare clinicians to take on responsibility of the seven core 
functions. The fact that clinicians in all facilities sampled reported receiving some 
training related to surveillance is significant, however. Abt Associates reported in the 
PHRPlus report (2006) that high employee turnover was most likely responsible for the 
finding that only 25% of facilities in the three northern regions had personnel who had 
received training despite the extensive efforts undertaken in the region. The 100% 
training rate found by this evaluation (2011) may be deceiving, however. Although 
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personnel in each of the five facilities sampled reported having received training specific 
to surveillance, they were not likely to have received knowledge of all of the basic skills 
necessary for carrying out surveillance [ 17]. No evidence was found to suggest that the 
detect and respond matrix is being used to guide the training of health facility personnel 
(Tables 2 and 3). 
Some ofthe facility personnel interviewed had only recently been employed. 
Similar to the phenomenon observed by Abt Associates in 2005, those who may have 
benefited from training on a specific function or procedure ofiDSR may have since left 
the facility. Sending select clinicians to the district for training may not be efficient or 
effective. It may be much more productive and cost effective to train clinicians at the 
facility where they will employ the practices learned on a day-to-day basis. This practice 
may help to assure that procedures remain in place when health workers move on. The 
PHRPlus report (2006) suggests the provision of"supportive, on-the-job training and 
reinforcement of skills" within facilities as a component of supervision provided by 
higher levels [17]. Ideally the district or sub-district would visit the facilities within its 
jurisdiction, evaluate the performance of the seven core functions, train the clinicians or 
sub-district health officer to perform all tasks and then return periodically to reinforce the 
improvements made and training provided. 
Motivation amongst actors appeared to be less frequent in sub-districts where the 
district provides less instruction specific to the routine tasks of surveillance (seven core 
functions), requires less accountability, and provides less encouragement or leadership. 
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The urbanizing sub-district 
It is important to note the possible effect that rapid urbanization may have on the 
function of surveillance in formerly rural areas that are or will be urbanizing as 
populations descend upon the peripheries of large cities. The investment in surveillance 
has not kept pace with development of one sampled sub-district where the population has 
greatly increased over the last decade transforming a number of small farming villages 
into a suburban community oftens of thousands. Evidence points to the fact that this 
sub-district is ill prepared for public health threats that may be associated with rapid 
population growth and recent urbanization. These include a cholera death in a house 
across the street from a GHS facility during the 2011 outbreak, the disintegration of the 
CBS volunteer initiative, the non-use ofthe CDl form, the lack of knowledge or interest 
in surveillance by at least one official responsible at the district level, no appointment of a 
sub-district disease control officer, and no knowledge of the use of data for the purpose of 
analysis and interpretation by any of the SDHT members. Limited resources and 
competing initiatives at the district level may have resulted in a lack of attention to the 
majority of the seven core functions observed within this particular sub-district. 
The urbanizing sub-district should be a priority for any effort to scale-up IDSR in 
Ghana. Additional research may find that the populations within these newly urbanizing 
areas may be of lower socio-economic status, be less educated, have less access to quality 
healthcare and public sanitation, and have unmet nutritional needs. The urban poor have 
been found to suffer from both the non-communicable diseases found within more 
affluent urban populations and the communicable diseases traditionally found in rural 
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areas [53]. Further investigation may determine that sub-districts around the country 
similar to the one described above and the districts in which they lie may be less prepared 
to quickly identify and respond to traditional and emerging treats that may accompany 
population growth and a surge towards the peripheries of large metropolitan areas. The 
warnings of the consequences of urbanization in the developing world in 21 st century [54] 
are very applicable to disease surveillance and response . Considering the need to respond 
to such changes, Moore, et a!. (2003) specifically call for policy that addresses the 
demonstrated need for systematic and useful urban health statistics [55]. The GHS 
should make special consideration of the important variable of urbanization when 
considering where to target limited IDSR resources. 
The potential of the pharmacy 
It is evident that many people in the evaluation communities were seeking first 
line care from pharmacies for one reason or another. It is likely that the only cases 
reported by pharmacies to the sub-district or nearest facility are those that the "chemical 
seller" feels he or she cannot "treat" . Thus, diseases and conditions are only passively 
reported when an individual moves on to a facility to seek treatment that could not be 
offered at the pharmacy. The potential contribution of the pharmacy to the identifY and 
report functions could be enormous. Pharmacy surveillance and the employment of the 
pharmacist as a detection method have proven to be successful. A community blood 
pressure surveillance feasibility study conducted by Earle, eta!. (2001), for example, 
found that a large proportion of patients with poor blood pressure control were detected 
by a pharmacist-led hype1tension monitoring service [56]. Investment in the 
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sensitization of "chemical sellers", in addition to other key community members with 
access to those seeking health care outside of the GHS system, is warranted. 
An urgent need for supervision 
The importance of supervision and follow-up for the maintenance and 
improvement of IDSR described within the PHRPlus report (2006) continues to be a 
relevant consideration especially in the wake of the availability of the updated Technical 
Guidelines for Ghana. The barriers to good supervision expressed by key informants or 
observed by the researcher provide a starting point from which improvement can be 
made. Supervision that includes the evaluation of reporting practices, clinicians ' 
knowledge of the seven core functions, and the minimum processes required by each 
facility and sub-district to maintain the seven core functions could be very valuable. The 
strategy would equally benefit from uniform training on how to perform supervision and 
evaluation including the distribution of a supervisory checklist. Peny, et al. describe the 
use of the IDSR matrix of skills and activities in Tanzania to specify accountability for 
each function at each level of the health system [52]. The health facility and community 
levels of the matrix provide an excellent supervision tool for both districts and sub-
districts (Tables 2 and 3). 
Community-based surveillance may benefit from an effort by the GHS to assure 
that CHPS are playing their role in the implementation and management of surveillance 
and response activities within the communities they serve. The location of CHPS within 
communities provides the opportunity for frequent interaction between health workers 
and community members which may not be available to SDHTs located in more 
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centralized health centers. CHPS provides an excellent opportunity for the sensitization 
and supervision of community members as described with the Technical Guidelines, (i.e., 
TBAs, school teachers, etc.). 
Recommendations for the improvement of IDSR at the sub-district level 
The following recommendations are organized under the two levels of IDSR that 
have been evaluated: community and health facility. Please note that recommendations 
are not listed in order of priority or importance. Recommendations by informants for the 
improvement of the strategy of the community and health facility levels can be found in 
Appendix 6. 
Community level 
• The CBS volunteer position should be eliminated. All community health 
volunteers/agents (i.e. CBA and volunteer vaccinators) should be sensitized to identify 
and report and provided with regular supervision related to surveillance and response. 
• Create a national coordinator of community level surveillance and response. 
• Districts that have not done so already should appoint one surveillance focal person 
responsible for the provision of leadership to community level surveillance. 
• Community level surveillance should be implemented as it is described within the 
Technical Guidelines (2002). Trained birth attendants, community or village health 
agents, or similar care providers, village leaders, school teachers, veterinaries or health 
extension workers, pharmacists (chemical sellers), and traditional healers and others 
should be sensitized and periodically visited by SDHT personnel who will reinforce their 
capacity to identify and report and provide motivation. 
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• SDHTs should be held accountable for the performance of community level 
surveillance within their jurisdictions. 
• Sensitize NGOs and other organizations working at the community level to promote 
and support community level surveillance by integrating IDSR into all health related 
initiatives. 
• Unusual events should be listed and explained clearly amongst the community level 
priority diseases listed in communication materials . 
• Create or modify job descriptions for all positions with tasks related to IDSR of the 
community level (GHS and volunteer) to reflect the content of the detect and respond 
matrix (Tables 2 and 3). 
• CHPS should be provided with materials and regular supervision to assure that they 
are fulfilling their role in the development and sustainability of community-based 
surveillance. 
Health facility level 
• Require all facilities to submit data collection forms (CDI , CD2, quarterly, 
line-listing, and case-based). A reporting log in place of the CDI can be kept by smaller 
"zero reporting" facilities. 
• Standardize a national facility level epidemiologic reporting sheet which corresponds 
with the standard case definitions found within the Technical Guidelines. 
• Implement disease control officer and clinician training within the trainee's home 
facility. 
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• Assure that two (ideally three) people are able to perform the duties associated with 
the seven core functions in each facility starting with the proper use of case definitions to 
identify and register entries upward. 
• Make a checklist of all materials required of a health facility to carry out the seven 
core functions, including documents, forms, posters, investigation and response materials 
etc., to facilities. Facilities can use this list to monitor supplies and materials and make 
requests, photocopies, or budgets accordingly. 
• Facilities should have at least two modes of communication, i.e. radio and cellular 
telephone. 
• Sub-districts should be provided with health facility surveillance M&E guidelines and 
given encouragement and instruction to conduct periodic M&E activities. 
• The NSU should review the policy and practices for detection and investigation 
targets for each priority disease (i.e. AFP rate) and evaluate if measures are being taken 
to meet these goals at the local level. 
• Laboratory results should be given to the health facilities and all other levels 
regardless of the result (positive or negative.) 
• Post all IDSR guidelines, training materials, reports and background information, 
reporting forms, PPS slides, and all other available information on a website. Provide all 
clinicians, disease control officers and others involved in the management of surveillance 
activities with the web link. New or updated documents would be posted as they become 
available. This is intended to supplement hard copy distribution by districts. 
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• Film and distribute surveillance related training sessions for clinicians and sub-district 
disease control officers . DVDs, MP4 files and online videos (i.e. YouTube) could be 
made available to sub-districts and facilities as learning tools. 
• Produce and distribute IDSR supervision guidelines for the di strict and sub-district 
levels based on the detect and respond matrix for the health facility and community levels 
(Tables 2 and 3). 
• The PHRP!us report (2006) should be reviewed for content relevant to the strategy 
described within the updated Technical Guidelines (2011). 
• Create or modify existing job descriptions for all positions, including clinicians, with 
tasks related to IDSR at the facility level to reflect the content of the detect and respond 
matrix (Tables 2 and 3). 
• Plan for the increased demands on IDSR that accompany growing populations and 
urbanization. 
Conclusions 
The IDSR strategy of Ghana, one of the earliest and best documented in sub-
Saharan Africa, has benefited greatly from the assistance of donor organizations and 
international technical assistance. The Public Health Division of the GHS believes that 
the strategy is working well with the exception of "gaps" which have been described as 
existing at the level of the sub-district, the health facility and community levels oflDSR. 
The evaluation ofthe community and health facility levels ofiDSR in three regions of 
Ghana provides evidence that surveillance and response is functioning but has not been 
fully implemented. 
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In a time when addressing the threat of emerging diseases and the consequences 
associated with globalization has become increasingly more pressing for the public health 
community, the community level ofthe IDSR strategy can be considered integral to our 
capacity to protect populations through timely detection and response activities. The 
additional programming and resources associated with the Guinea worm eradication 
initiative, which relies on the CBS volunteer, have helped to sustain community level 
surveillance and response in the Northern Region. The community level was not found 
to be functioning, however, in the three communities evaluated within the Eastern and 
Greater Accra Regions where similar support had not been provided. Resource and 
other limitations make the CBS volunteer an unrealistic approach to community level 
IDSR nationally. Additionally, the recommendations for community level IDSR 
provided within the Technical Guidelines of Ghana (2002) have generally not been 
followed. 
The establishment of clear roles and accountability at each level of the 
infrastructure for tasks related to the management of the strategy at the community level 
are necessary for sustainability in the long term. The Technical Guidelines provide an 
excellent approach to the strategy of the community level especially considering resource 
limitations. Sensitization of key individuals ofthe community level described within the 
Technical Guidelines, " ... trained birth attendants, community or village health agents, or 
similar care providers, village leaders (religious, traditional or political) or school 
teachers, veterinaries or health extension workers, pharmacists, and traditional healers", 
to perform the essential identifY and report functions is a logical first step. Strengthening 
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of district level leadership associated with community level implementation is also 
essential. The detect and response matrix should be focused upon as it provides an 
excellent tool for planning the essential roles and responsibilities of the community level. 
The strategy was found to be functioning within the health facilities sampled. Of 
the seven core functions, respond was found to be the strongest. Although some 
variability was observed across the facilities sampled, identify, report, and feedback were 
found to be functioning at a minimum level in most. As expected, these functions were 
stronger where a disease control officer was present. In sub-districts where clinicians are 
solely responsible for surveillance, facilities rely upon the district to conduct many of the 
activities related to the seven core functions. These facilities are entirely dependent upon 
the district to perform the investigate function, for example. Analyze and interpret and 
evaluate and improve were not found to be functioning in most facilities regardless of the 
position responsible. 
Further analysis may find that non-disease control officer sub-districts may be 
less functional than their equivalents in AFRO countries where clinicians are exclusively 
responsible for surveillance and response. The GHS might consider diverting resources 
used to transport and train clinicians at large workshops to the installation of more sub-
district level disease control officers and the training of clinicians within their home 
facility. Training of clinicians locally could result in higher content retention, the 
immediate implementation of processes tailored to each unique facility, and increased 
ownership of and responsibility for the seven core functions. Additionally, the provision 
of incentives for clinicians to investigate suspected cases of priority diseases may prove 
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to increase case detection. 
The evaluation found that many of the numerous, high-quality technical materials 
created for Ghana were absent within facilities or other levels. A number of these can be 
found within the PHRPlus report (2006). All essential technical materials should be 
made available to health facilities immediately. The Standard Case Definitions rest at the 
top of this list. 
The high population density urban sub-metro poses unique challenges not 
encountered within other sub-districts. Whereas a small group of community leaders 
demonstrated interest in the health of the community and working with the SDHT, the 
general population is disinterested and demands compensation for any participation in 
community activities. The community sampled has reportedly lost interest in 
participation in initiatives such as community surveillance and response as a result of 
fatigue associated with exposure to numerous non-governmental and GHS initiatives as 
well as other social factors. Additional effmt on the pmt of the GHS and SDHTs may be 
needed to recognize the unique needs of the urban neighborhood and develop creative 
solutions. 
Consideration of the ever-changing environment in which IDSR must be 
sustained is of great importance. Multiethnic urbanizing areas that may have previously 
been characterized as rural areas or smaller towns comprised generally of one ethnic 
group are developing on the periphery of large cities. Districts will have to adapt to meet 
the objectives of the strategy as the demographics of these populations change reflecting 
the influx of people coming from different parts ofthe country in an effort to find 
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economic opportunities. 
A decline in resources dedicated to IDSR within the last two or three years in the 
sub-districts evaluated may be somewhat responsible for the Jack ofleadership and 
accountability demonstrated by some responsible for the performance of surveillance and 
response within health facilities and communities. A focus on non-financial resources or 
intellectual so lutions is especially important presently as resources are not likely to 
become more readily available in the near future. Strong leadership from the higher 
levels of the health system with a focus on the distribution of high quality detailed 
guidelines and instructional materials based on the seven core functions and the detect 
and respond matrix are needed. These improvements coupled with measures to assure 
accountability, the provision of "in-house" training within facilities, and supervision 
designed to support the goals of training and processes created within each unique facility 
may be amongst the solutions to filling in the "gaps" . 
As an early implementer of IDSR that benefited from a great deal of assistance 
from donors, Ghana is positioned to be a leader in IDSR within sub-Saharan Africa. The 
PHRPlus report (2006) describes a model strategy with an extensive number of tools and 
materials created for the provision of training, management and sustainability ofiDSR at 
the level of the sub-district [ 17]. The updated Technical Guidelines (20 11) for Ghana 
may be best implemented by revisiting the methodology and materials developed for the 
three nmthern regions of Ghana a decade ago. A special focus on the "bottom up" 
approach should be considered. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Specific objectives oflntegrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) 
for the African region 
1) Strengthen the capacity of countries to conduct effective surveillance activities: train 
personnel at all levels; develop and carry out plans of action; and advocate and mobilize 
resources. 
2) Integrate multiple surveillance systems so that forms, personnel and resources can be 
used more efficiently. 
3) Improve the use of information to detect changes in time in order to conduct a rapid 
response to suspect epidemics and outbreaks; monitor the impact of interventions: for 
example, declining incidence, spread, case fatality, and to facilitate evidence-based 
response to public health events; health policy design; planning; and management. 
4) Improve the flow of surveillance information between and within levels of the health 
system. 
5) Strengthen laboratory capacity and involvement in confirmation of pathogens and 
monitoring of drug sensitivity. 
6) Increase involvement of clinicians in the surveillance system. 
7) Emphasize community participation in detection and response to public health 
problems including event-based surveillance and response in line with IHR. 
8) Trigger epidemiological investigations in detection, investigation and reporting of 
public health problems, and in the implementation of effective public health 
interventions. 
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Appendix 2. Priority diseases, conditions and events for Integrated Disease Surveillance 
and Response- 2010 1 
Epidemic prone diseases Diseases targeted for Other major diseases, events or 
eradication or elimination conditions of public health 
importance 
Acute haemorrhagic fever Buruli ulcer Acute viral hepatitis 
syndrome* Dracunculiasis Adverse events following 
Anthrax Leprosy immunization (AEFI) 
Chikungunya Lymphatic filariasis Diabetes mellitus 
Cholera Neonatal tetanus Diarrhoea with dehydration 
Dengue Noma less than 5 years of age 
Diarrhoea with blood (Shigella) Onchocerciasis HIV/AIDS (new cases) 
Measles Poliomyelitis 1 Hypertension 
Meningococcal meningitis !Disease specified by IHR Injuries (Road traffic 
Plague (2005) for immediate Accidents) 
SARS* notification Malaria 
Typhoid fever Malnutrition in children under 5 
Yellow fever years of age 
*Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley, Maternal deaths 
Las sa, Mental health (Epilepsy) 
Crimean Congo, West Ni le Fever Rabies 
**National programmes may wish Severe pneumonia less than 5 
to add Influenza-like illnesses to years of age 
their priority disease list STis 
Trachoma 
Trypanosomiasis 
Tuberculosis 
Diseases or events of international concern 
Human influenza due to a new subtype I 
SARSl 
Smallpox! 
Any public health event of international or national concern 
(infectious, zoonotic, food borne, chemical, radio nuclear, or 
due to unknown condition. 
!Disease specified by IHR (2005) for immediate notification 
1Taken from Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response, 2"d 
Edition, October 2010. 
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Appendix 3. Case definitions for community surveillance as described in the Technical 
Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in Ghana, 2002 [21]. 
Epidemic-prone diseases 
Cholera: Any person 5 years of age or more with lots of watery diarrhoea and sometimes 
vomiting profusely as well. In case of cholera outbreak anybody who passes 
watery/loose stool. 
Diarrhoea with blood: Any person who has passed 3 or more watery stool containing 
blood in the past day. 
Measles: Any person with fever and rash. 
Meningitis: Any person with fever and neck stiffness. 
Viral haemorrhagic fevers: Any person who has an unexplained illness with fever and 
bleeding or who died after an unexplained severe illness with fever and bleeding. 
Yellow fever: Any person with fever and yellow discoloration of the eyes. 
Diseases targeted for eradication 
Acute flaccid paralysis (poliomyelitis): Any person who develops sudden weakness in the 
limbs. 
Dracunculiasis (guinea worm): Any person with worms emerging from any part of the 
body. 
Diseases targeted for elimination 
Leprosy: Any person with skin patch of a lighter colour with diminished or loss of 
sensation. 
Neonatal tetanus: Any newborn who is normal at birth and then, after 2 days, becomes 
unable to suck or feed. 
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Lymphatic filariasis: In an endemic area, any person who suffers from any of the 
following: 
• Repeated attacks of fever with painful swellings in the groin, testes, leg, breast or 
vulval area. 
• Swollen legs (elephantiasis). 
• Swollen scrotum (hydrocoele). 
Diseases of special public health focus 
Severe malaria: Any person who has an illness with high fever and a danger sign 
(Danger signs are severe pallor, lethargy, unconsciousness, confusion, sleeping all 
the time, yellowing ofthe eyes, passing dark or coca-cola urine, vomits everything, 
convulsions, inability to sit or stand and, in children less than 5 years, inability to drink or 
breastfeed). 
Tuberculosis: Any person with cough for 3 weeks or more. 
Other diseases ofpublic health importance 
Buruli ulcer: Any person who develops a firm, painless, often itchy swelling or an 
extensive swelling with/without colour change over the affected skin in a place where a 
lot of residents suffer from big sores with undermined edges and "dirty cotton wool-like" 
centre on different parts of the body in endemic areas. 
Diarrhoea in children less than 5 years of age : Any child that has passed 3 or more 
watery stools within the past day. 
Viral hepatitis: Any person with fever and yellow discoloration of the eyes. 
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Pneumonia in children less than 5 years of age: Any child less than 5 years of age with 
cough and fast breathing or difficulty breathing. 
Onchocerciasis: Skin rash and nodules. 
Urinary schistosomiasis: Any person passing blood during or after urinatidn. 
Trachoma: Any person with repeated discharge and redness of the eyes or the in-turning 
of the eyelids or the eyelashes rubbing on the eyes. 
Yaws: Any person with small swellings on the skin looking like a boil which when peeled 
off, results in bleeding of the area instead of discharge of pus. 
Note that the priority diseases for community-based surveillance includes all of the 
diseases reported within Ghana (23 priority diseases) less HIV and sexually transmitted 
infections (STis) [40]. 
108 
Appendix 4. Case definitions for identification and reporting of priority diseases or 
conditions 1 
Epidemic-prone diseases 
Cholera: Any person 5 years of age or more who develops severe dehydration or dies 
from acute watery diarrhoea (rice-water stools). 
Diarrhoea with blood: Any person with diarrhoea (passage of 3 or more watery or loose 
stools within the past 24 hours) and visible blood in the stool. 
Measles: Any person with fever and maculopapular (non-vesicular) generalized rash and 
cough, coryza or conjunctivitis (red eyes) or any person in whom a clinician suspects 
measles. 
Meningitis: Any person with sudden onset of fever (>38.5°C rectal or >38 .0°C axillary) 
and one of the following signs: neck stiffness, altered consciousness or other meningeal 
signs. 
Viral haemorrhagic f evers: Any person with severe illness, fever and at least one of the 
following signs: bloody stools, vomiting blood or unexplained bleeding from gums, nose, 
vagina, skin or eyes . 
Yellow f ever: Any person with sudden onset of high fever (>39°C), followed by jaundice 
within two weeks of onset of first symptoms. 
Diseases targeted for eradication 
Acute flaccid paralysis (poliomyelitis): Any child less than 15 years of age with sudden 
(within three days) onset of flaccid paralysis or a person of any age in whom the clinician 
suspects polio. 
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Dracunculiasis (Guinea worm disease): Any person with a history of skin lesion and 
emergence of Guinea worm within one year of the skin lesion. 
Diseases targeted for elimination 
Leprosy: Any person with one or more of three cardinal signs ofleprosy: 
• Hypopigmented or reddish skin lesion. 
• Loss or decrease of sensations in skin patch. 
• Enlargement of peripheral nerve with or without bacteriological diagnostic 
confirmation and requiring chemotherapy (excluding patients released from treatment). 
Neonatal tetanus: Any newborn with a normal ability to suck or cry during the first two 
days of life, and who, between 3 and 28 days of age, cannot suck normally and becomes 
stiff or has spasms or both. 
Lymphatic filariasis: Any person living in an endemic area who experiences recurrent 
attacks of fever, adenolymphangitis, or epidydimo-orchitis. 
OR 
• Hydrocoele or lymphoedema in a resident of an endemic area for which other causes 
ofthese findings have been excluded. 
OR 
• ~aboratory confirmation of lymphatic filariasis (i.e. microfilaria positive, antigen 
positive or biopsy positive) even if the patient does not meet the clinical case definition. 
Diseases of special public health focus 
AIDS in an adult: 
AIDS is diagnosed ifthe patient has either: 
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• 3 major symptoms/signs 
OR 
• at least two major symptoms/signs and at least one minor symptom/sign and positive 
HIV antibody test. 
OR 
• Kaposi sarcoma and positive HIV antibody test. 
OR 
• Cryptococcal meningitis and positive HIV antibody test. 
In a child <12yrs: 
AIDS is diagnosed if the patient has: 
• At least two major symptoms/signs and at least 2 minor symptoms/signs and a 
positive HIV antibody test. 
a. Major signs: more than 10% weight loss; chronic diarrhoea (for more than 1 
month); prolonged fever (intermittent or constant, for more than 1 month). 
b. Minor signs: persistent cough (for more than 1 month); generalised pruritic 
dermatitis; recurrent herpes zoster; oropharyngeal candidiasis; chronic 
progressive and disseminated herpes virus infection; generalized 
lymphadenopathy. 
Malaria 
• Uncomplicated malaria: Any person with fever or fever with headache, back pain, 
chills, sweats, myalgia, nausea and vomiting diagnosed clinically as malaria. The person 
may feel unwell or tired. Young children may have abdominal pain and poor feeding 
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alone or in addition to any of the above symptoms. Uncomplicated malaria cases are 
those managed on an outpatient basis. 
• Uncomplicated malaria, lab-confirmed: Any person with fever or fever with 
headache, back pain, chills, sweats, myalgia, nausea and vomiting and with laboratory 
confirmation of diagnosis by malaria blood film or other diagnostic test for malaria 
parasites. 
• Severe malaria: Any person hospitalized with primary diagnosis of malaria and 
confirmed by a positive blood smear or other diagnostic test for malaria. In addition, the 
person may have any of the following: Change in behavior (confusion or drowsiness), 
altered consciousness, general weakness (prostration), convulsions, hypoglycemia (sugar 
< 2.2 mol/L), difficulty in breathing, renal failure (reduced urine output), severe 
anemia/pallor (Hb < 5g/dl), coca-cola dark urine, jaundice/yellow urine, hyperpyrexia 
(temp > 39.5°C), spontaneous bleeding (DIC). 
Other diseases of public health importance 
Buruli ulcer: Any person with painless nodule, papule, plaque or edema evolving into a 
painless ulcer with undermined edges, often leading to invalidating sequelae in an 
endemic area. The different clinical forms of the active type of the disease are as 
follows: 
• Papule: painless and raised skin lesion less than lcm in diameter. 
• Nodule: painless palpable firm lesion, 1-2 em in diameter situated in the 
subcutaneous tissue and usually attached to the skin. 
112 
• Plaque: usually painless, well-demarcated, elevated, indurated lesion more than 2 em 
in diameter. 
• Edema: diffuse, extensive, non-pitting, ill-defined margin, firm , and may be painful 
with or without color change over the affected skin. 
• Ulcer: painless skin lesion characterized by a necrotic center, undermined edges and 
oedematous skin. An early ulcerative lesion has a diameter of less than 2 em and a late 
ulcerative lesion has a diameter of more than 2 em. 
Diarrhoea in children less than 5 years of age: 
Diarrhoea with some dehydration: Any child less than 5 years of age with diarrhoea 
(passage of 3 or more watery or loose stools within the past 24 hours) and 2 or more of 
the following conditions: 
• Restless or irritable. 
• Sunken eyes. 
• Drinks eagerly, thirsty. 
• Skin pinch goes back slowly. 
Diarrhoea with severe dehydration: Any child less than 5 years of age with diarrhoea and 
2 or more of the following conditions: 
• Lethargic or unconscious. 
• Sunken eyes. 
• Not able to drink or drinking poorly. 
• Skin pinch goes back very slowly. 
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Viral hepatitis: Any person with acute illness typically including: acute jaundice (within 
one week of onset of fever); dark urine; anorexia; malaise; extreme fatigue ; and right 
upper quadrant abdominal tenderness. 
Tuberculosis: Smear-positive pulmonary tuberculosis: Any patient with cough for 3 
weeks or more and: 
• At least 2 sputum specimens positive for acid-fast bacilli by microscopy. 
OR 
• 1 sputum specimen smear positive for acid-fast bacilli and radiographic abnormalities 
consistent with active pulmonary tuberculosis as determined by the treating medical 
officer. 
OR 
• One sputum specimen smear positive for acid-fast bacilli and one sputum specimen 
culture positive for acid-fast bacilli. 
Onchocerciasis: In an endemic area, any person with fibrous nodules in subcutaneous 
tissues. 
Schistosomiasis: Urinary schistosomiasis: Any person with terminal haematuria. 
Intestinal schistosomiasis: A person with chronic or recurrent intestinal symptoms (blood 
in stool, bloody diarrhoea, diarrhoea, abdominal pains) or at a later stage, 
hepatosplenomegaly. 
Sexually transmitted infections (STis): 
Genital ulcer syndrome: Any male with an ulcer on the penis, scrotum or rectum, with or 
without inguinal adenopathy, or any female with an ulcer on the labia, vagina, cervix or 
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rectum, with or without inguinal adenopathy. 
Urethral discharge syndrome: Any male with urethral discharge with or without dysuria. 
Trachoma: Any person with recurrent inflammation and scarring of the conjunctiva and 
inner lining of the eyelid. The late stage of the disease may manifest as in-turned eye lids 
(entropion) with the eyelashes rubbing on the cornea (trichiasis). 
Yaws: Primary yaws: The presence of granulomatous ulcers (usually on the face or 
extremities) accompanied by enlargement of the regional lymph glands within 2-8 weeks 
of the spirochaetal infection. 
1Adapted from Standard Case Definitions for 23 Priority Diseases, Ghana Health 
Service/Ministry of Health, May 2002. 
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Appendix 5. Flow chart of the process required to collect, transp01t, and report one AFP 
case in the Aburi Sub-district 
End here: 
Nouguchi Laboratory (Legon, GAR): The sample is received by the national reference lab. 
Begin here: 
Aburi sub-district community: A CBS volunteer, 
CBO or medical assistant notifies the sub-district 
disease control officer of a suspected case. A case 
investigation is likely to be performed in a home or 
clinic. 
l2 round 
t -tnps tt 
Aburi sub-district disease control unit: 
The sub-district disease control officer 
investigates and takes two samples 24 hours 
apart. The protocol stipulates that the 
sample and data collection form are brought 
to the district disease control officer by the 
sub-district disease control officer. 
Motorcycle is used to transport specimen. 
District disease control 
unit (Nsawan): The 
district disease control 
officer transports the 
specimen to the regional 
disease control unit. 
Regional disease control unit (Kofordiua): The regional di sease control officers checks 
the quality of the sample and investigation form. The region transports the sample to the 
laboratory in Legon, Accra by means of a regional level vehicle. This trip takes 
approximately two hours depending on traffic. The sample will pass the Aburi Sub-
district on its way to the laboratory. 
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Appendix 6: Suggestions for the improvement of IDSR at the sub-district level offered by 
the evaluation informants 
The following are the opinions of the informants from the national level official 
through the community member related to how the strategy may be improved at the sub-
district level. The responses have been organized by the major categories mentioned 
most frequently by the informants. 
Money matters 
Volunteers, community leaders, clinicians and disease control officers reported 
that community level surveillance and response can be improved by providing a 
"motivation", a financial incentive, on a regular basis. Weekly, monthly and quarterly 
distributions had been suggested. A district disease control officer in a district where 
CBS is likely to be functioning well believes that a quarterly allowance of 20 cedis 
(approximately USD 12.50) should be provided to volunteers. Some suggest withholding 
"T &T" or other forms of motivation from volunteers who are not performing their duties. 
Supervision and accountability 
One volunteer suggested that accountability could be created if the volunteers 
were required to report to someone on a regular basis to have their registers checked. 
Visits to communities by health workers or disease control officers to provide supervision 
would reportedly be more frequent if an adequate supply of fuel were provided. One 
regional disease control officer suggested providing health workers with a "motivation" 
to visit communities for supervision. Sub-districts have asked that a standard supervisory 
checklist (for community and health facility level supervision) be provided by the district 
or region. 
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A volunteer reported witnessing other volunteers filling in questionnaires or 
registers with false information. He recommended that the GHS help volunteers to 
understand the value and importance of volunteer work in order to take their 
responsibility more seriously. 
The appointment of a surveillance focal person in each health facility was 
mentioned by one district as no one individual was generally in charge of surveillance 
related activities. The same officer suggested that districts perform regular monitoring of 
health facility surveillance activities and provide regular feedback. 
Community member participation 
Community level informants mentioned the need to increase community 
members ' knowledge about health in general and the health issues of their patticular 
communities. They believed that community members who understand the importance of 
public health might be more motivated to participate in surveillance activities. A 
number of community level informants suggested using captive audiences as a means to 
reach-out to community members for surveillance-related activities including education. 
Antenatal clinics and durbars held for other purposes were specifically mentioned as 
appropriate platforms. A disease control officer suggested using media sensitizations to 
promote reporting by the public, such as radio "jingles". 
Equipment and resources 
The need for bicycles was mentioned by many of the informants. They 
suggested that broken down bicycles should be replaced and that regular maintenance be 
provided. One regional disease control officer reported that some volunteers need 
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motorcycles. Presumably these are rare cases in which a volunteer must travel over many 
kilometers in a rural area where other transportation options are not available. Many 
informants at all levels suggested the distribution of "Wellington" boots, raincoats and ID 
cards. The ID card has been described as a way to appease community members who 
might not understand that volunteers are working in collaboration with the GHS. T-shirts 
were mentioned as a valuable incentive by one, as the volunteers feel proud to be 
working with GHS when wearing them. 
Although not the case in all facilities, a number of clinicians and disease control 
officers reported a need for an adequate supply of reporting forms and the original copies 
of missing forms which may or may not have been provided by the district at one time. 
Numerous informants from different levels reported the need for transportation funds, 
fuel, motorcycles and vehicles (4X4) to facilitate movement. Maintenance for 
motorcycles was also mentioned as an essential need. Informants suggested that the GHS 
revert back to the stronger and more reliable Yamaha AG 100 motorcycle. A number of 
informants expressed the need for cellular telephone credit for the reporting of priority 
diseases and other surveillance related tasks. Informants also mentioned the need for 
land line telephones. A number of informants reported the need for hand held radios like 
those used by security firms or the police. Pen drives and computers with internet 
modems were also mentioned. The urban sub-metro reported the need for a fax machine. 
A regional disease control officer suggested that the use of a flexible budget based 
on a receipt system, locally referred to as "imprest", could help sub-districts to better 
utilize available resources for surveillance related activities. Training would be needed, 
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however, as some sub-districts haven't yet been introduced to this concept. Under 
"imprest" sub-districts would be encouraged to use funds allotted for initiatives, like TB 
for example, to maintain and improve general surveillance activities. 
Training and knowledge 
Most of the volunteers in the areas where community surveillance was not 
functioning expressed the need for training. GHS informants also called for more 
training of volunteers, some even recommending it on a quarterly basis. A sub-district 
disease control officer suggested that training of volunteers could be improved by moving 
trainings from the district to the sub-district where they would be held in collaboration 
with a district official. Some informants suggested that the wrong individuals, usually 
those looking for money, have been recruited as volunteers. It was recommended at the 
community level that the community itself choose the volunteer. 
Informants reported the need for training of health facility staff, especially in 
localities where no surveillance-specific training had been provided. The need to train 
clinicians on proper reporting of priority diseases and conditions was mentioned 
numerous times. The proper use of clinic registers and records and reporting forms was 
specifically mentioned . Some mentioned that training within the health facility would be 
more effective than large trainings held at the district level. A need to hold trainings as 
frequently as every quarter was mentioned by some. Others suggested semi-annual or 
annual refreshers. One sub-district disease control officer suggested appointing someone 
as a sub-district training coordinator, responsible for appointing personnel to attend 
workshops and trainings held by the district. This focal person would match the most 
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appropriate position with the content of the workshop offered and ensure that all of the 
information obtained from the activity is shared with other members of the SDHT upon 
returning to the sub-district. 
Incentives 
Certificates of appreciation were mentioned as potential incentives for volunteers 
by both health officials and volunteers. Some volunteers expressed an interest in 
receiving special treatment or some kind of recognition when they and their family 
members present at the health facility for care. A clinician also mentioned the 
importance of such attention to volunteers. Some officials expressed the importance of 
integrating CBS volunteers into other volunteer initiatives (i.e. , EPI and child survival) as 
a means of providing incentive. The lunch, per diem, and t-shi1ts, as well as simply 
serving an imp01tant purpose during a periodic non-CBS volunteer initiative reportedly 
serve as incentives for the volunteers. A failure to integrate volunteers, however, as 
regional disease control officer remarks, can have a very negative effect on the 
productivity of volunteers. The morale ofthose who have not been invited to participate 
in a non-CBS initiative that provides a bicycle or a "motivation", for example, may be 
significantly lowered. 
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